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Recent Decisions

ADMIRALTY-COGSA-BILL

OF LADING

CARGO

DESCRIPTION

AND

PACKER IDENTITY DETERMINE WHEN A CONTAINER IS A PACKAGE IN

COGSA

LIABILITY PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff, a consignee, brought an action in admiralty against

defendant carrier seeking recovery for loss of cargo under section 4(5)

of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).1 The goods in
question 2 had been packed in a single shipping container3 by
plaintiff's agent in Germany and then presented sealed to defendant
for transport to the United States. Neither the shipper nor the
shipping documents indicated the container's contents.4 The container arrived in good order in New York but while in a dock storage

1. Section 4(5) provides: "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event
be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the
transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package lawful money
of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other currency, unless the nature and
value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and
inserted in the bill of lading. This declaration, if embodied in the bill of lading,
shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be conclusive on the carrier.
"By agreement between the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier and the shipper
another maximum amount than that mentioned in this paragraph may be fixed:
Provided, That such maximum shall not be less than the figure above named. In
no event shall the carrier be liable for more than the amount of damage actually
sustained." 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970).
2. Pursuant to plaintiff's order, a German manufacturer delivered 350 adding
machines to a German freight forwarder who in turn shipped them to defendant.
Plaintiff estimated replacement cost of the machines at $28,959.61. Royal
Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
3. Each adding machine was encased in a corrugated box. The freight
forwarder loaded all the boxed machines into a single shipping container, which
was then sealed and delivered to defendant. The metal shipping container weighed
in excess of two tons when loaded.
4. The ocean bill of lading described the container as "1 Container said to
contain machinery" and contained the notation "Shipper's Load, Stowage and
Count." 346 F. Supp. at 1024.
Spring, 1973

area awaiting final delivery its contents were stolen.' Plaintiff
contended 6that each parcel packed within the container constituted a
"package" under the package liability limitation provision of COGSA
section 4(5). Defendant contended that the shipping container
constituted a single package under the COGSA rule. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, held, plaintiff
was entitled to recover for the loss of one package. When a shipper
packs goods in a container, delivers the sealed container to the carrier,
and fails to describe its contents in the bill of lading, the package
limitation provisions of COGSA will apply to the container as a whole
and not to its constitutent parts. Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V
Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In response to attempts by carriers to limit inordinately their
liability for damaged cargo 7 and to the need for international
5. Although the loss occurred on land, after the act of carriage was complete,
the maritime contract continued to govern the relationship between the shipper
and the carrier until final delivery was effected. See David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 339 F.2d 295, 297 (2d Cir. 1964).
6. The Act does not define "package." The framers attempted to establish a
common sense standard involving a unit that would be fairly predictable in size, so
the parties would know at the time of contracting whether additional coverage
was required. Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1967).
7. See H. R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). Prior to 1936,
when COGSA was passed, carriers had been able to limit their liability for loss of
cargo to insignificant amounts. Hearings on S.1152 Before the Senate Comm. on

Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
8. See Hearings,supra note 7, at 15.
9. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, opened for signature August 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155. The
Hague Convention was accepted without substantial change by the United States
in the form of domestic legislation in 1936. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49
Stat. 1207 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970).
10. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d
7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969);Hearings,supra note 7, at 45.
11. 46 U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970).
12. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970). The parties cannot lower the carrier's
liability below $500. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) states in part: "Any clause, covenant,
or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from
liability for loss of or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section,
or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null
and void and of noeffect ..... Pursuant to § 1304 (5),however, the carrier will in
no event be liable for more than the actual worth of the lost goods. This appears
to be the only situation in which the carrier's liability would be less than $500 per
package.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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uniformity in ocean carriage documentation, 8 an international convention at The Hague9 drafted rules to standardize documentation
practice." These rules are embodied in the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA). 11 COGSA fixes carrier liability at 500 dollars per
package, unless actual damages are less.12 Additional coverage remains
a matter of private agreement between the parties. 3 Thus the carrier
is relieved of the burden of total indemnification for ruined goods.1 4
COGSA, however, does not define "package.""5 The determination of
what constitutes a package consequently has become a source of
frequent litigation resulting in numerous judicial attempts to fashion a
definition. Neither size and weight of the cargo, 16 nor extent of
protective covering" appears to be critical in delimiting a package.
Rather, the courts have examined the presence and extent of
packaging preparation used to facilitate handling. 8 Recent technological advances in the use of large shipping containers holding
many smaller parcels have compounded the definitional problems,19
leading the courts to formulate new tests. In Standard Electrica, S.A.
2 °
the
v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft,
Second Circuit defined a package by examining the shipping documents' characterization of the cargo21 and the identity of the cargo's
packer, and held that the shipping container was one package within

13. 2 P.
H.

229 (1970). See also
198-99 (1967).

MANCA, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW

LONGLEY, COMMON CARRIAGE OF CARGO

14. 2 P. MANCA,

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW

229 (1970).

15. Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1967).
16. See Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382, 384 (2d
Cir. 1962) (321/ ton roll of steel enclosed in a wooden box held one package,
entitling shipper to $500 recovery for its loss).
17. See Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135, 137 (2d
Cir. 1959) (court rejected test dependent on the extent of external covering).
18. See Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir.
1968) (court relied on the test whether the goods were "put up in a form suitable
for transportation or handling").
19. The impact of the "container revolution" in transportation that occurred
after the formulation of COGSA is discussed briefly in Standard Electrica. 375
F.2d at 945.
20. 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967).
21. The shipping documents to which the court referred were the bill of
lading, the dock receipt and the shipper's invoice. These documents all described
the cargo in terms of containers where package information was required. 375
F.2d at 946.
Spring, 1973
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the meaning of section 4(5) of COGSA.2 2 Thus in delineating a
package, the court attached considerable significance to the actions of
the parties. 23 This analysis was followed in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S.
Mormaclynx,24 which, however, reached the opposite conclusion that
each parcel, not the container, was a package. The different results
were justified primarily by different cargo descriptions in the shipping
documents. 2 The Leather's Best opinion suggested as a matter of
policy that applying the 500 dollar limitation to containers would
reduce carrier liability below that envisioned by COGSA's framers. 6
In the factual situation presented, however, the court found it
unnecessary to reconcile this policy with the documentation test.27
The proposed amendments to COGSA contained in the Brussels
Protocol of 1968 employ StandardElectrica'sdocumentation test, but
establish carrier liability at the higher of 10,000 francs per package or
30 francs per kilo.2 8 In this way, a reasonable minimum carrier

22. Judge Feinberg, in a vigorous dissent, challenged the test employed by the
majority and the result reached. 375 F.2d at 947-48.
23. The court stated: "[S] uch characterizations [by the parties] are entitled to
considerable weight in that the parties each had the same understanding as to
what constitutes a 'package' and those characterizations further reflect the
meaning given that term by the custom and usage of the trade." 375 F.2d at 946.
24. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
25. In Standard Electrica the container had been packed by the shipper and
the documents referred to the number of containers in the shipment, not the
number of parcels. In Leather's Best the carrier packed the container and the bill
of lading enumerated the contents of the container.
26. "[W]e cannot escape the belief that the purpose of § 4(5) of COGSA was
to set a reasonable figure below which the carrier should not be permitted to limit
his liability and that 'package' is thus more sensibly related to the unit in which
the shipper packed the goods and described them than to a large metal object,
functionally a part of the ship, in which the carrier caused them to be
'contained.' " 451 F.2d at 815. See also 313 F. Supp. 1373, 1380 (E.D.N.Y.
1970), in which the district court stated that "[t]he language of the package
provision in COGSA is basically inconsistent with treating a loaded container as a
package." The Second Circuit seems not to have gone that far.
27. If indeed the court views the container as merely a functional part of the
ship, then it should make little difference how the cargo is described in the
documents, especially in light of COGSA's policy motivations, which were noted
by the court. The factual situation in the instant case did not require a choice by
the court between the test it employed and the policy considerations that it
noted.
28. The proposed amendment to § 4(5) reads in part: "Where a container,
pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods, the number of
packages or units enumerated in the Bill of Lading as packed in such article of
Vol. 6-No. 2
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liability is maintained regardless of whether the container or its parcels
are found to be "packages."
The court in the instant case, faced with a container versus parcel
package dispute, employed the tests developed in Standard Electrica.
After distinguishing the instant case from Leather's Best on the facts,
the court observed that in this case the shipper packed the goods in a
container and delivered it sealed to the carrier. The court also noted
that the bill of lading described the goods as "one container."2 9
Finding no separate statements of higher value, nor of the container's
contents,3" the court reasoned that since plaintiff's shipper had
chosen the container and so described it in the bill of lading, the
container constituted a package for COGSA purposes. Plaintiff was
accordingly limited to a single 500 dollar recovery.
The Kulmerland court was presented with the clash presaged in
Leather's Best between shipping documents that characterized the
container as a package and a policy that individual parcels are
packages for purposes of COGSA. By following the analysis developed
in Standard Electrica, the court continued to place interpretive
responsibility on the actions of the parties3 1 rather than reconciling

transport shall be deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose of this
paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. Except as aforesaid such
article of transport shall be considered the package or unit." Protocol to Amend
the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating
to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, art. 2(c), in 2 P. MANCA, INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME LAW 256 (1970). This should be read in conjunction with another
subsection that states: "Unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the Bill of Lading, neither
the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or
damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent
of Frcs. 10,000 per package or unit of Frcs. 30 per kilo of gross weight of the goods
lost or damaged, whichever is the higher." Id. art. 2(a), at 255-56 (emphasis
added). Thus, even if the container was delimited a package, carrier liability would

presumably be based on the per kilo figure, due to the container's weight, and the
COGSA policy of setting a reasonable figure below which carrier liability should
not be permitted to fall would be maintained.
29. 346 F. Supp. at 1024.
30. Id.
31. By referring to the parties' own actions in determining liability, the court
ran the risk of contravening § 3(8) of COGSA, which states in part that "[a] ny
clause... in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier... from liability.., or
lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and
void." 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1970).
Spring, 1973
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container usage with any policy standard contemplated by COGSA.
This would seem to indicate that the court is prepared to accept
containers as "packages" within the meaning of COGSA when the
parties do so. Such an approach discourages any uniform judicial
treatment of containers. More importantly, however, judicial acceptance of containers as packages effectively causes a regression to the
situation existing prior to The Hague Convention, when carrier cargo
liability was extraordinarily low.3 2 When combined with Standard
Electrica, the instant case places responsibility on the shipper, not the
carrier, to insure that cargo is. properly identified in the shipping
documents. Thus a carrier enjoys substantially reduced liability if
either he or the shipper fails to note in the bill of lading the contents
of containers prepacked by the shipper. Such a result ignores the
inevitable benefit inuring to the carrier, regardless of who chooses the
container.3 3 This result also conflicts with the underlying policy of
COGSA that carrier liability should at all times be something more
than nominal.34 The language of sections 4(5)35 and 3(8)36 of
COGSA makes it clear that a minimum carrier liability was intended
despite actions by the parties to circumvent the liability imposed.3 7
The treatment afforded containers by the proposed amendments to
COGSA in the Brussels Protocol of 1968 further argues against the
result in the instant case. The Protocol provides for reference to the
shipping documents in deciding what will be a package. Presumably,
the test will be applied in the manner currently employed by those
courts following38 Standard Electrica. By coupling this test with a
liability provision based on the higher of a per package or per kilo
figure, however, the Protocol preserves the carrier's irreducible
minimum liability in a way not possible under the instant holding. The
Protocol thus argues strongly against attempts to characterize containers as packages under present conditions.3" In effect, the
amendments obviate the container-package problem. The instant case,
in its use of the documentation test, partly anticipates the judicial

32. See note 7 supra.
33. By use of a container, the carrier can reduce by over 90% the time
required for loading and unloading a vessel. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S.
Mormaclynx, 313 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. See note 7 supra.
35. See note 1 supra.
36. See note 12 supra.
37. Id.
38. See generally Inter-American Foods, Inc., v. Coordinated Caribbean
Transport, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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approach suggested by the amendments. Absent the safeguards
afforded the shipper by these amendments, however, the documentation test may yield a result contrary to the basic intention of COGSA.
It can be hoped that the instant decision will spur efforts aimed at
ratifying the Protocol. In the interim, the onus will remain on the
shipper to insure complete cargo description in the shipping documents in order to guarantee recovery for ruined goods in the amounts
contemplated by COGSA.
Alan L. Marchisotto

RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-JURISDICTION OVER AVIATION TORT CLAIMS-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

DOES NOT EXTEND TO AVIATION TORT CLAIMS IN

THE ABSENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TORT
AND TRADITIONAL MARITIME ACTIVITIES

Immediately after takeoff from a lakefront airport in Cleveland, the
jet engines of petitioners' aircraft ingested several seagulls that had
been flushed from the runway. Consequently, the airplane lost power
and crashed into the navigable waters of Lake Erie.' Petitioners
brought an action in admiralty2 to recover damages for the loss of the
aircraft, alleging that respondents3 were negligent in failing to keep
the runway free of birds and in failing to give proper warning of the
birds' presence. The district court found that petitioners' allegations
failed to satisfy the criteria for admiralty jurisdiction over torts and
dismissed the complaint.4 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

1. While the aircraft sustained some initial damage on land when it struck the
airport's perimeter fence and a parked pickup truck, it subsequently sank in Lake
Erie a short distance from the end of the runway and as a consequence was a total
loss. No passengers were on board at the time, and there were no injuries to the
crew.
2. Admiralty jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970), which
provides in part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of ... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled."
3. The city of Cleveland, as owner and operator of the airport, the airport
manager and the air traffic controller, who was responsible for clearing the aircraft
for takeoff, were named as defendants in the suit.
4. The district court held that admiralty jurisdiction over torts may properly
be invoked when two criteria are met: first, the locality where the alleged tortious
wrong occurred must have been on navigable waters; and secondly, there must
have been a relationship between the wrong and some maritime service,
navigation or commerce on navigable waters. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City
of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 251 (1972) (the district court's opinion is unreported,
but it is summarized and reproduced in part in the text of the Supreme Court's
opinion). The district court found that in this case "the alleged negligence became
operative upon the aircraft while it was over the land" and that "the 'impact' of
the alleged negligence occurred when the gulls disabled the plane's engines [over
the land]." 409 U.S. at 251-52. The court concluded therefore that the first
criterion had not been satisfied. In addition, the court held that the second
criterion had not been satisfied because the wrong bore no relationship to
maritime service, navigation or commerce: "[T] he operative facts of the claim in
this case are concerned with the land-connected aspects of air-commerce, namely,
the maintenance and operation of an airport located on the land and the dangers
encountered by an aircraft when using its runways for take-off." 409 U.S. at 252.
Vol. 6-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W

concluded that because the birds were encountered over the runway
the alleged tort was nonmaritime and therefore affirmed the
dismissal.' On writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court, held, affirmed. Absent a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activities, aviation tort claims arising from flights within the
continental United States by land-based aircraft are not cognizable in
admiralty. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S.
249 (1972).
The United States Constitution grants the federal judiciary subject
matter jurisdiction over "all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction." 6 While federal maritime jurisdiction over contracts is
dependent on a subject matter conceptualization of the pendant
contract, 7 federal maritime tort jurisdiction traditionally has been
dependent on a spatial conceptualization of the location of the tort.8
Early American courts sitting in admiralty required that the wrong be
committed on the high seas or within the ebb and flow of the tide in
order to be a "maritime" tort. Thus, in the early leading case of
Thomas v. Lane,9 Justice Story held that a libel for assault and
battery and false imprisonment could not be maintained in admiralty
because there were no allegations that the torts were committed on

5. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed solely on the ground
that "the alleged tort in this case occurred on land before the aircraft reached
Lake Erie .. . ." Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151,
154 (6th Cir. 1971). The court of appeals therefore found it unnecessary to
decide whether a maritime nexus or relationship was necessary to invoke
admiralty jurisdiction. 448 F.2d at 154.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ch;1. For interpretive discussions of this
constitutional grant see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
1-9 (1957); 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
.200[2], at 2031 (2d ed.
1972).
7. In the early leading case of De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3,776)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815), Justice Story held that the federal maritime jurisdiction
"extends over all contracts (wheresoever they be made or executed, or whatsoever
may be the form of the stipulations) which relate to the navigation, business or
commerce of the sea." 7 F. Cas. at 444. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 6, at 18-28.
8. In a frequently quoted passage, Justice Story stated: "On the whole, I am,
without the slightest hesitation, ready to pronounce, that the delegation of
cognizance of 'all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' to the courts
of the United States comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The
latter branch is necessarily bounded by locality

....

"

De Lovio v. Bolt, 7 F. Cas.

418 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (dictum).
9. 23 F. Cas. 957 (No. 13,902) (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
Spring, 1973
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the high seas.1" Subsequently, the locality test for federal maritime
tort jurisdiction was expanded to include not only high seas and
tidewaters but all navigable waters, including lakes and rivers." The
locality test became even more firmly entrenched in federal maritime
jurisprudence in 1866 when, in The Plymouth, 2 the Supreme Court
held that federal maritime tort jurisdiction did not embrace a wrong
that had originated on the water but which had ultimately caused
injury on land.' 3
While the Court defined the locality test
narrowly,1 4 it indicated that locality alone, regardless of whether the
transaction or activity was essentially "maritime," was the
determinative factor in delineating the boundaries of federal maritime
tort jurisdiction."5
The strict use of the locality test was first
questioned by the judiciary' 6 in 1903 in Campbell v. Hackfield &

10. Concerning maritime tort jurisdiction, Justice Story opined: "In regard to
torts I have always understood that the jurisdiction of the admiralty is exclusively
dependent upon the locality of the act. The admiralty has not, and never (I
believe) deliberately claimed to have any jurisdiction over torts, except such as are
maritime torts, that is, such as are committed on the high seas, or on waters
within the ebb and flow of the tide." Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957,960 (No.
13,902) (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
11. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). See
generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 28-30.
12. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
13. A fire had begun on board ship and spread to the shore, destroying a
wharf and a packing house. The Court held that a libel brought against the ship
for the damage done ashore was not cognizable in admiralty. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at
36.
14. The Court defined the locality test as follows: "[T]he wrong and injury
complained of must have been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable
waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation of the same must have taken
place upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction.... The
jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts does not depend upon the wrong
having been committed on board the vessel, but upon its having been committed
on the high seas or other navigable waters." 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 35.
15. "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel
or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) at 36.
16. Judge Erastus Benedict, in his 1850 treatise on admiralty, had earlier
questioned the strict use of the locality test to determine maritime tort
jurisdiction: "It may, however, be doubted whether the civil jurisdiction, in cases
of torts, does not depend upon the relation of the parties to a ship or vessel,
embracing only those tortious violations of maritime right and duty which occur
in vessels, to which the admiralty jurisdiction, in cases of contracts, applies. If one
of several landsmen bathing in the sea, should assault, or imprison, or rob another,
Vol. 6-No. 2
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Co.'" In Campbell, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that in the absence of a maritime nexus a tort committed on the high
seas or in navigable waters was not within admiralty jurisdiction. 8
Subsequent courts found the strict application of the locality test to
be problematic,1 9 and, even in cases in which the maritime locality of
the tort was clear, the strict application of the locality test often led
to absurd results.20 Nevertheless, most courts adhered to a mechanical
application of the strict locality rule2
and sustained admiralty
jurisdiction despite a lack of any connection between the wrong and

it has not been held here that the admiralty would have jurisdiction of the action
for the tort." E. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 308 (3d ed.
1894). See 409 U.S. at 257.
17. 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903).
18. In Campbell, a longshoreman was injured while unloading cargo from a
ship anchored in navigable waters off Honolulu. He brought a libel against the
vessel, its owner, officers and crew, although his primary allegations were against
his stevedore-employer and fellow employees. The court said: "In the case of
torts, locality remains the test, for the manifest reason that, to give an admiralty
court jurisdiction, they must occur in a place where the law maritime prevails. But
this is by no means saying that a tort or injury in no way connected with any
vessel, or its owner, officers, or crew, although occurring in such a place or
territory, is for that reason within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. On the
contrary, it is, as has been seen, only of maritime contracts, maritime torts, and
maritime injuries of which the United States courts are given admiralty
jurisdiction." 125 F. at 700. But cf. Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S.
52 (1914).
19. For example, in Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928), a
longshoreman unloading a vessel was standing on the pier when he was struck by a
cargo hoist attached to the ship and knocked into the water where he was later
found dead. The Supreme Court held that there was no admiralty jurisdiction over
this case, despite the fact that the longshoreman was knocked into the water,
because the blow by the sling was what gave rise to the cause of action, and it
took effect on land: "The substance and consummation of the occurrence which
gave rise to the cause of action took place on land." 276 U.S. at 182. In the
converse factual situation, however, in which a longshoreman working on the deck
of a vessel was struck by a cargo hoist and knocked onto the pier, the Court
upheld admiralty jurisdiction because the cause of action arose on the vessel,
which was on navigable waters. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647
(1935). See also The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935).
20. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965) (admiralty jurisdiction applied in case concerning injury to a swimmer by a
surfboard); King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (admiralty
jurisdiction applied in case concerning injuries to a water skier).
21. See 7A J. MOORE, supra note 6, .325[3],at 3526.
22. See, e.g., cases cited note 20 supra.
Spring, 1973
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traditional forms of maritime commerce and navigation.2" Other
courts, however, began to consider a "locality plus" standard-locality
plus maritime nexus-to avoid the application of admiralty law to
cases unrelated to traditional maritime activities.2 3 Because the
development of air commerce involved occasional accidents over the
seas, the strict use of the locality test raised special problems. Courts
initially declined admiralty jurisdiction both because aircraft could
not be characterized as maritime "vessels" and because aviation was

23. See, e.g., McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). In McGuire, a bather at a public beach sued in admiralty when her hand
was injured by a submerged object. The court reasoned that the law of admiralty
should be extended when commercially necessary: "Admiralty jurisdiction as a
protective companion to commerce has grown with the needs of commerce and
retained a marked degree of flexibility. It is proper that admiralty jurisdiction be
extended where commercial necessity so dictates." 192 F. Supp. at 871. The court
noted that the commencement of an admiralty action unrelated to maritime
commerce "misinterpret[s] the nature of admiralty jurisdiction." 192 F. Supp. at
872. Accordingly, the court held that the facts in that case did not justify the
recognition of a cause of action in admiralty. Accord, Peytavin v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972) (admiralty jurisdiction denied
plaintiff who sought damages for injuries allegedly received in a rear end collision
on a floating pontoon at ferry landing); Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525
(6th Cir. 1969) (insufficient nexus to traditional maritime activities to sustain
admiralty jurisdiction for injury resulting from fall from lighthouse); Chapman v.
City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967) (insufficient maritime
relationship to sustain admiralty jurisdiction when swimmer injured at public
beach). See also Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50
COLUM. L REV. 259, 264 (1950); Note, The Bases and Range of Federal
Maritime Law: Indicia of Maritime Competence, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

187 (1972); 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1964); 44 TUL. L. REV. 166 (1969).
The strict application of the locality test has also been assailed in the converse
situation-i.e. when the tort has no maritime locality, but does bear a relationship
to maritime service, commerce or navigation. For example, in O'Donnell v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943), the Court sustained the
applicability of the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970)) to injuries to a seaman on
land, because of the seaman's connection with maritime commerce. The Court in
that case relied on an analogy to the landward applicability of the traditional
seamen's remedy of maintenance and cure: "[T]he maritime law ...has not in
general allowed recovery for personal injuries occurring on land. But there is an
important exception to this generalization in the case of maintenance and cure.
From its dawn, the maritime law has recognized the seaman's right to
maintenance and cure for injuries suffered in the course of his service to his vessel,
whether occurring on sea or land." 318 U.S. at 41-42. Similarly, Congress passed
the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970), which provides:
"The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and
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not restricted to the airspace over the navigable waters.2 4 Although a
few courts held that a seaplane, while afloat, was a "vessel" and
therefore subject to admiralty jurisdiction,2" there was doubt whether
admiralty jurisdiction should apply at all in the field of
aviation.2 6 The court in Choy v. Pan-AmericanAirways Co.2 7 finally
established a definite rule bringing aircraft within admiralty
jurisdiction in actions brought pursuant to the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA).2 s In Choy, the court sustained admiralty jurisdiction

include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on
navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or
consummated on land." The House Report on the Extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act stated that the Act was being passed to remedy the "inequities"
of such cases as Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911), The Troy, 208 U.S. 321
(1908) and Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316
(1908), which had held that there was no admiralty jurisdiction to provide a
remedy for damage done by ships on navigable waters to land structures. H.R.
REP. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
24. The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914) (libel in rem for
repairs against an airplane that had crashed in navigable waters).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Northwest Air Serv., Inc., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1935) (seaplane held not a vissel within admiralty jurisdiction while stored in a
hangar on dry land); Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133
N.E. 371 (1921) (admiralty jurisdiction upheld when claimant injured while
trying to save a seaplane drifting toward beach). Contra, Wendorff v. Missouri
State Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S.W.2d 99 (1927) (seaplane held to be a flying
machine not subject to admiralty jurisdiction).
26. Courts were justifiably concerned with the applicability of admiralty law
to aircraft and air commerce, particularly after the passage of the Air Commerce
Act of 1926, which provides in part: "The navigation and shipping laws of the
United States, including any definition of 'vessel' or 'vehicle' found therein and
including the rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not be construed to apply
to seaplanes or other aircraft or to the navigation of vessels in relation to seaplanes
or other aircraft." 49 U.S.C. § 177 (1946), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a)
(1970). See United States v. Peoples, 50 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Cal. 1943). See also
Dollins v. Pan Am. Grace Airways, 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Noakes v.
Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
27. 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (action for wrongful death of
passenger of seaplane that crashed into the Pacific Ocean).
28. 46 U.S.C. § § 761-68 (1970). DOHSA provides a wrongful death cause of
action in admiralty for death caused by wrongful acts or negligence occurring on
the high seas beyond one marine league from shore of the United States. 46
U.S.C. § 761 (1970). Since Choy, federal maritime jurisdiction has consistently
been sustained in cases involving actions for wrongful death under DOHSA arising
out of aircraft crashes into or accidents over the high seas beyond one marine
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under DOHSA without regard to the existence of a maritime
nexus.2 9 The rationale of the DOHSA cases involving aircraft-that
federal maritime jurisdiction under DOHSA should not be defeated
merely because the instrumentality was an aircraft-was subsequently
extended, however, to invoke admiralty jurisdiction over claims arising
out of aircraft crashes into or accidents over the high seas beyond one
marine league from shore even when DOHSA was inapplicable.3" In
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,3 1 the Third Circuit extended

federal maritime tort jurisdiction over aircraft accidents even further
by allowing an action in admiralty for wrongful death resulting from
an airplane crash in the navigable waters of Boston Harbor, within the
territorial waters of Massachusetts. Although jurisdiction was
sustained on the basis of locality, the court noted that the dangers to
persons and property resulting from an aircraft crash in navigable
waters are similar to those arising from the sinking of a ship or a
collision between two vessels.32 Moreover, the court found a
significant relationship between ships and aircraft because they
perform similar functions over and across the same waters.3 3 Courts
subsequent to Weinstein, however, relied solely on maritime locality
to sustain admiralty jurisdiction over aviation tort claims34 and
league from shore. See, e.g., Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also cases cited, 409 U.S. at 263 n.13. Accordingly, the
Court in the instant case noted: "Indeed, it may be considered as settled [law]
today that this specific federal statute gives the federal admiralty courts
jurisdiction of such wrongful death actions." 409 U.S. at 263-64.
29. The court in Choy avoided conflict with the Air Commerce Act of 1926
by stating that the DOHSA is not strictly a navigation or shipping law. 1941
A.M.C. at 485.
30. Several cases held that actions for personal injuries arising out of aircraft
crashes into the high seas more than one marine league off shore or arising out of
aircraft accidents in the airspace over the high seas were cognizable in admiralty
because of the maritime locality, although they were not within the scope of
DOHSA or any other specific federal legislation. See, e.g., Horton v. J. & J.
Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Notarian v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Bergeron v. Aero Associates,
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La. 1963).
31. 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963).
32. 316 F.2d at 763.
33. 316 F.2d at 763.
34. See, e.g., Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (action against manufacturer of jet bomber and the United States for death
of bailee's employee over the high seas when employee fell from aircraft); Harris
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. Iowa 1967) (wrongful death
action arising from airplane crash in navigable waters of Lake Michigan).
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continued to uphold federal maritime jurisdiction over claims arising
out of crashes into or accidents over navigable waters that were within
state territorial limits.3"
In the instant case the Court concluded that maritime locality alone
is not sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction over claims arising
from airplane accidents.3 6 The Court noted that strict application of
the locality test could produce absurd results"1 and reasoned that in
deciding whether claims arising from aircraft crashes into or accidents
over navigable waters are cognizable in admiralty, reliance on the
relationship of the alleged wrong to traditional maritime activity is far
more reasonable and consistent with the history and purposes of
maritime law."8 The opinion of the Court expressly recognized two
avenues that are open for bringing admiralty actions based on aviation
torts: first, statutes such as DOHSA -provide the basis for admiralty
jurisdiction in some aviation tort cases;3 9 and secondly, in the absence
of specific federal legislation, the wrong must "bear a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity." 4 While the Court
criticized the Weinstein court's conclusion that any plane crash in
navigable waters had a significant relationship to maritime
activity, 4 it suggested that in some circumstances an aviation tort
may be sufficiently related to traditional maritime activity to be
cognizable in admiralty.4 2 Because the Court found that the crash of
petitioners' plane in the navigable waters of Lake Erie was wholly
fortuitous and bore no significant relationship to traditional maritime

35. Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970); Harris v. Jnited
Air Lines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. Iowa 1967); cf.Scott v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
36. 409 U.S. at 268.
37. 409 U.S. at 265-68. Cf. Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385
F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967); Hastings v. Mann, 226 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.C. 1964),
aff'd, 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1965); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp.
866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
38. 409 U.S. at 261.
39. See note 28 supra.

40. 409 U.S. at 268.
41.

See note 32 supra and accompanying text.

42. The Court hypothesized that domestic aviation may come within the
admiralty jurisdiction when a transoceanic or coastal flight crashes at sea or
possibly when a plane performs a task traditionally performed by waterborne
vessels. 409 U.S. at 271 & n.22, 274 & n.26. See also Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co.,
431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970) (suit involving mid-air collision over Gulf of Mexico

between two aircraft employed to spot schools of fish properly brought in
admiralty).
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activities involving navigation and commerce, it held that the pendant
action was not cognizable in admiralty.
While the Court's holding in the instant case was directed toward
claims arising from airplane accidents, the instant decision represents
Supreme Court recognition of the "locality plus" test of federal
maritime tort jurisdiction;4 3 as a result it will undoubtedly have a
substantial impact in other areas of federal maritime tort
jurisdiction." The Court's strong preference for the additional
requirement of a maritime nexus in maritime tort cases-that the
history and purpose of admiralty would be served best by requiring
that a wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity involving navigation and commerce4 -makes it conceptually
inconsistent for tort claims arising from other, nonaviation activities
on navigable waters that are unrelated to the traditional maritime
activity of navigation and commerce to be brought in admiralty.4 6 The instant decision therefore signals a significant and
jurisprudentially sound movement toward delimiting the boundaries
of admiralty competence by reference to the needs and usages of
traditional maritime commerce. 4 7 Unfortunately, however, the
opinion expands the present legal vacuum in the area of aviation law.
Actions that may be brought in admiralty pursuant to a federal statute
such as the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act4" or

43. Under the Court's holding, the basis of admiralty jurisdiction over claims
arising from aircraft accidents in the absence of specific legislation is a "significant
relation to traditional maritime activity" as well as the traditional locality
requirement. 409 U.S. at 268.
44. Cf. Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965) (action brought in admiralty by swimmer injured by surfboard); King v.
Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (action brought in admiralty by
injured water skier); Blevens v. Sfetku, 259 Cal. App. 2d 527, 66 Cal. Rptr. 486
(1968) (action brought in admiralty by injured water skier).
45. 409 U.S. at 261.
46. See cases cited note 44 supra.
47. It has been argued effectively that "[a] court should have competence in
admiralty to render a decision in a particular case if the case concerns the needs
and usages of maritime commerce. The bases and range of federal maritime law
indicate that a case concerns the needs and usages of maritime commerce if it is
one in which the cause of action is based on a relationship ... (1) between two or
more parties, one of whom is a [sea] carrier; and, (2) that creates a consensual or
legal obligation the object of which is activity to regulate either the profits
produced by the use of the vessel or the losses to which the use of the vessel is
subject." Note, The Bases and Range of Federal Maritime Law: Indicia of
Maritime Competence, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 187, 222 (1972).
48. See note 23 supra.
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DOHSA4 9 remain unaffected by this decision. Since the Court
reserved the question whether aviation torts not embraced by the
provisions of DOHSA or other specific federal legislation can ever have
sufficient maritime nexus to come within admiralty jurisdiction,"0 the
Court reserved also the possible alternative of applying admiralty rules
and concepts to govern these cases. Therefore, the unresolved question
pertains not to the possibility of upholding admiralty jurisdiction in
these situations but to the desirability and consistency of doing so in
relation to the tradition, needs and usages of maritime commerce.
Moreover, in the area of international air commerce, the Court
offered several factors in addition to locality and maritime nexus that
should be considered in determining whether an action arising from
an airplane accident should come within federal maritime tort
jurisdiction. These factors included choice of forum problems, choice
of law problems and problems involving international agreements--all
of which may require the application of a developed and uniform
body of federal law such as admiralty."' Because the application of a
uniform body of federal law eliminates the disparate results created by
the application of different state laws and different state courts'
interpretations of such problems as choice of law," the Court has
sacrificed uniformity of result in many aviation tort cases 3 in order
to move toward a definition of maritime competence that more
closely corresponds to traditional maritime activities. The availability

49. See note 28 supra.
50. 409 U.S. at 271.
51. 409 U.S. at 271-72. In the area of international law, it may be argued that
air accidents over navigable waters are within the scope of the Warsaw
Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876. Several cases have held
that the Convention provides no independent cause of action. See Notarian v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874, 877 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Noel v. Linea
Aeropostal Venozolana, 144 F. Supp. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also 7A J.
MOORE, supra note 6,
.330[4], at 3721. Maritime principles, therefore, should
be applied to provide a uniform legal framework for litigation arising pursuant to
the Warsaw Convention. Id.
52. Without the use of a uniform body of law such as admiralty, suits could
be brought in several states, subject to varying bodies of law. 7A J. MOORE, supra
note 6, .330[5], at 3771.
53. Cases involving claims arising from aircraft crashes into navigable waters
that because of the instant decision are not now cognizable in admiralty will be
brought in state courts, or in federal courts (under diversity jurisdiction), either
of which will apply the appropriate state's common law or wrongful death statute.
The Court recognized that its present holding may lead to "divergent results and
duplicitous litigation in multi-party cases" in these instances. 409 U.S. at 273.
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of admiralty jurisdiction even to those aviation torts sanctioned as
"maritime" by the instant decision still will not depend completely on
the activity but on the fortuitous locality of the accident or
destination of the flight. The air traveler from New York to Los
Angeles should be entitled to the same protection and remedies as the
air passenger traveling from New York to London, whose claim might
be within admiralty jurisdiction. Under the instant decision, however,
the outcome of an action arising from an aviation accident may differ
widely depending on the direction in which the aircraft flies.
Moreover, the passenger embarking on a transoceanic flight should
find his remedies in domestic courts the same whether his plane
crashes on land during takeoff or on the high seas en route. Air
commerce is now subject to a variety of laws but uniformity cannot be
achieved by sporadically applying admiralty rules to aviation. While
the instant decision resolves a troublesome question concerning the
applicability of maritime principles to a particular class of aviation
torts, the decision is but a small step toward clarifying the limits of
admiralty jurisdiction over air commerce. The Court's decision implies
correctly that the needs of air commerce are not the same as those of
the maritime community and that the body of law that grew up in
response to the needs of maritime commerce is not necessarily
appropriate to govern the needs of air commerce. Accordingly, in view
of both the uncertainty that presently surrounds the question of
which body of law governs aviation accidents and the disparate legal
results that accrue once that question is resolved by respective courts,
the Supreme Court's invitation to Congress to provide comprehensive
federal legislation 4 to clarify the area seems most appropriate.
W. H. Schwarzschild III

54. "If federal uniformity is the desired goal with respect to claims arising
from aviation accidents, Congress is free ... to enact legislation applicable to all
such accidents, whether on land or water, and adapted to the specific
characteristics of air commerce." 409 U.S. at 274.
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ALIENS-ALIENS MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)

Plaintiff, a Mexican national registered as a resident alien, brought
suit against his employer and his union under 42 U.S.C. § 1981' and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 to enjoin further alleged
employment discrimination and to recover damages for past
discrimination. Plaintiff worked in defendant corporation's Dock and
Commodity Department in which insurance coverage for employees'
families living in the United States was included as a fringe benefit.
Plaintiff's family did not qualify for this insurance benefit, however,
because they resided in Mexico. Subsequently, defendant union voted
that Mexican nationals maintaining families in Mexico be given last
preference for jobs in the Dock and Commodity Department.
Pursuant to this vote, plaintiff was transferred to the Cotton Compress
and Warehouse Department, where family insurance was not offered
as a fringe benefit. Plaintiff terminated his employment and brought

1. "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-1 to 2000e-15 (1970). Subsection 2000e-2(a) states:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Subsection 2000e-2(c) states: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-(1) to exclude
or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify its memberships, or to classify or fail or refuse for
employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an
applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section."
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suit.3 Defendants contended that section 1981 is inapplicable to
private employment discrimination and that aliens are not within the
scope of section 1981. On stipulation of the above facts both parties
moved for summary judgment. The District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, held, injunction granted. The court dismissed that
part of the action based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644
because the record did not reveal any discrimination based on the five
prohibited classifications of Title VII, i.e. race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.' Aliens, however, are members of the class intended
to be protected by section 1981 and employment discrimination
based on alien status is actionable under this provision. Guerra v.
Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
The legislative history and the judicial interpretations of section
1981 have been the source of much controversy and conflict,
concerning both the type of action that may be maintained and the
scope of the class to be protected. The type of action that may be
maintained under section 1981 depends on whether Congress enacted
section 1981 pursuant 'to its power to enforce the thirteenth
amendment or pursuant to its power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment. The United States Code cites the Civil Rights Act of

3. Plaintiff worked for sixteen months and did not bring suit until four years
after his transfer. The court noted that since there is no statute of limitations for
§ 1981, the Texas statute of limitations for general civil actions (Thx. REV. Civ.
STAT. art. 5529 (1948)) or for contract claims (TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art.
5527 (1948)) was applicable. Both these statutes provide four-year limitation
periods. This seemingly barred plaintiff's claim, but the court held that plaintiff's
filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission after his
transfer and before he terminated his employment tolled the running of the
statute of limitations for the claim based on § 1981. Guerra v. Manchester
Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529, 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
4. It has been held that discrimination based on alienage or citizenship is not
within the scope of Title VII. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.
1972). In Espinoza, plaintiff, a registered alien, was denied employment because
she was not a United States citizen. Plaintiff claimed that the denial was
discrimination based on national origin and thus prohibited by Title VII. The
court noted that defendant employed many persons of plaintiff's nationality who
were citizens. Thus the sole basis for defendant's discrimination was plaintiff's
noncitizenship. On examining the legislative history and the plain meaning of Title
VII, the court concluded that Congress did not intend to include discrimination
based on alienage within the scope of Title VII. 462 F.2d at 1334.
5. 350 F. Supp. at 533. The court further stated that any actual discrimination
practiced by defendants was based on the foreign residency of plaintiff's family
and on plaintiff's status as an alien, and that neither of these bases is among the
prohibited classifications of Title VII.
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18706 as the source of section 1981. The 1870 Act was passed under
the authority of Congress to enforce the fourteenth amendment,' and
the Supreme Court has held that the 1870 Act was a constitutional
exercise of that power.8 These facts seemingly place section 1981
under the fourteenth amendment. Section 18 of the 1870 Act,
however, reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 18661 and stated that
section 16 of the 1870 Act, the predecessor of section 1981, was to be
enforced under the provisions of the 1866 Act.1" The 1866 Act had
been passed pursuant to Congress's power to enact legislation to
enforce the thirteenth amendment.1 1 In In Re Turner, 2 the court
determined that the 1866 Act was a constitutional exercise of
congressional power under that amendment. These facts seemingly
place section 1981 under the thirteenth amendment. Thus the courts
were confronted with the problem of deciding whether a cause of
action based on section 1981 had to satisfy the requirements of the
thirteenth or the fourteenth amendment. Although both amendments
are designed to attack discrimination, their requirements are different.
The fourteenth amendment requires that the discrimination be the
result of state action; the thirteenth amendment has no state action
requirement. One theory postulated that section 1981 was enacted
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, which was designed to
prohibit private discrimination, 3 and that, therefore, section 1981
could be the basis of a cause of action for private discrimination. The

6. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 144, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
8. The Court quoted the statutory language of § 1981 and stated that "[t] his
Act puts in the form of a statute what had been substantially ordained by the
constitutional amendment. It was a step towards enforcing the constitutional
provisions." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880).
9. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
10. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
12. 24 F. Cas. 337 (No. 14,247) (C.C.D. Md. 1867). In Re Turner involved an
indenture of apprenticeship that did not contain certain security provisions
required by state law for the protection of the apprentice, a former slave. The
court said that this constituted involuntary servitude and contravened § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. The court then stated: "This law having been enacted
under the second clause of the thirteenth amendment ...is constitutional ....
"
24 F. Cas. at 339.
13. This theory, while never stated explicitly by the Supreme Court, was
plausible in light of statements made by the Court. For example, the Court had
stated that "[u]nder the Thirteenth Amendment, the legislation, so far as
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Supreme Court, however, rejected this theory in Hodges v. United
States,14 holding that a cause of action based on section 1981 could
not be maintained in federal court if only private discrimination was
involved. This decision effectively placed section 1981 under the
fourteenth amendment and thus required state action whenever the
statute was to be the basis of an action. Hodges remained the law until
s
1968, when the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co."
held that a cause of action based on private discrimination in the sale
of real property was authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1982 since that
provision was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment.
Although restricting the holding in Jones to private discrimination
relating to real property, the Court used broad language to describe

necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary
servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals,
whether sanctioned by State legislation or not; under the Fourteenth ...it
[legislation] must necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character,
addressed to counteract and afford relief against State regulations or
proceedings." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883). In another case, the
Court stated: "It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment by direct legislation." Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218
(1905).
14. 203 U.S. 1 (1906). Plaintiffs, all Negroes, were hired as laborers in a
sawmill. Defendants, all white men, threatened plaintiffs with bodily harm unless
they quit their jobs. Plaintiffs quit their jobs and brought suit in federal court
under R.S. § 1977 (the statutory forerunner of § 1981). Defendants were
convicted in federal district court for interfering with plaintiffs' employment
contracts. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the federal courts did not
have jurisdiction under R.S. § 1977 and that plaintiffs must seek relief in the
state courts. The Court stated that private interference with an employment
contract did not constitute slavery or involuntary servitude-the evils against
which the thirteenth amendment was specifically directed. Plaintiffs' remedy was
an action either for trespass or for assault brought in the state court. 203 U.S. at
17-18.
15. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). It is important to note that this case was decided on
the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). This statute, which is derived from the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, guarantees all citizens equal rights concerning real and
personal property. Plaintiff alleged that defendant refused to sell him a house
solely because of plaintiff's race, thus violating § 1982. Defendant contended that
this statute applied only to state action and not to private discrimination. The
Court held "that § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in
the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid
exercise of the power of Cohgress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." 392
U.S. at 413.
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congressional powers under the thirteenth amendment.1 6 More
importantly, the Court intimated that section 1981 was applicable to
private discrimination in contracts for employment, noting that
section 1981 was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866.17 The
effect has been to place section 1981 under the thirteenth amendment
powers, thus making possible certain causes of action based on private
employment discrimination."8 The second problem area concerning
section 1981 is the scope of the class intended to be protected by the
statute. The solution of this problem is dependent on the intent of

16. The Court cited both the Civil Rights Cases and the Clyatt case for the
proposition that Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of individuals.
392 U.S. at 438. See note 13 supra. The Court also stated that "Congress has the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation." 392 U.S. at 440.
17. The Court stated that the right to contract for employment was a right
secured by § 1981 and noted that the Court in the Hodges case had construed the
thirteenth amendment and congressional power under that amendment very
narrowly. "The conclusion of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with the
position taken by every member of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and
incompatible with the history and purpose of the Amendment itself. Insofar as
Hodges is inconsistent with our holding today [in the Jones case], it is hereby
overruled." 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. Thus the Court expressly rejected a narrow
interpretation of either the thirteenth amendment or congressional power under
that amendment.
18. In cases subsequent to the Jones decision, a preponderant majority of
federal circuit and "district courts have held that § 1981 is a basis for an action for
private employment discrimination. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (dismissal from job
allegedly due solely to race). See also Youngy. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438
F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971) (alleged racial discrimination in hiring); Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (alleged racial discrimination in union hiring);
Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968)
(alleged racial discrimination in union hiring). Only one court has refused to apply
§ 1981 to private employment discrimination based on race since the Jones
decision. Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
The court based its decision on a narrow reading of the Jones decision, pointing
out that Jones was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1982, not § 1981. The court specifically
disapproved of the Dobbins decision, as an unwarranted extension of the Jones
decision. 50 F.R.D. at 521. The court also said that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 specifically preempted an action for private employment
discrimination based on § 1981. Five reasons were given for this preemption: a
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Congress when the Civil Rights Act of 1870 was passed. One line of
authority maintains that section 1981 applies only when the
discrimination involved is racially motivated. This rationale relies
heavily on Georgia v. Rachel, 9 in which the Court analyzed the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and concluded "that
Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifically
defined in terms of racial equality."": The other line of authority
maintains that aliens are included within the class intended to be
protected by section 1981, pointing to the textual change in the
statute that occurred when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was reenacted
in the Civil Rights Act of 1870. While the 1866 Act included "all
persons born in the United States,"'" the 1870 Act was changed to
include "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States,"2 2 a
phrase that has been held to include aliens.2 3 In addition, aliens have
been included as proper subjects of civil rights legislation in Supreme
Court decisions dealing with state discrimination.2 4 In each of these

contrary rule would make Title VII redundant; the prospective nature of Title
VII indicates that it is novel legislation; Title VII is more comprehensive than §
1981; Title VII provides administrative machinery to handle such claims without
resorting to litigation; and to permit an action under § 1981 would require
extraordinary judicial tasks. 50 F.R.D. at 519-21.
19. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
20. 384 U.S. at 791. Although the Rachel case was not decided on the basis
of § 1981, it specifically dealt with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Given the
Court's intimation in the Jones decision that § 1981 is derived from the 1866
Act, it is reasonable to conclude that § 1981 is designed to secure racial equality.
Several federal courts have dismissed actions based on § 1981 that did not involve
racial discrimination. E.g., Marshall v. Plumbers Local 60, 343 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.
La. 1972) (§ 1981 extends only to racial discrimination); Seneca Constitutional
Rights Organization v. George, 348 F. Supp. 51 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (§ 1981
extends only to racial discrimination); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (§ 1981 does not extend to
employment discrimination based on sex); Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070
(E.D. Wis. 1969) (§ 1981 does not extend to discrimination based on religion or
national origin).
21. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
22. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.
23. Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F. Supp.
576, 577 (N.D. Ill.
1936). Both of these cases involved the right of aliens to
maintain suit under § 1981.
24. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (discriminatory
distribution of welfare benefits); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948) (discriminatory licensing statute); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
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cases the Court cited section 1981 or its statutory forerunners for the
proposition that aliens are entitled to the protection of the
fourteenth amendment guarantees. Prior to the instant case, however,
the question whether an alien may maintain an action under section
1981 for private discrimination involving neither racial discrimination
nor state action had not been considered.
In the instant case, the court first examined extensively the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to determine the
Act's intended coverage. The court found that the 1870 Act had its
origins in a Senate bill to reenact the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and to
extend its coverage.2" The court noted that this proposed bill referred
26
to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States"
Legislative discussions of the bill indicated that aliens were within the
class of persons to be protected by the bill." The court then
examined the line of cases stating that aliens are protected by the f6urteenth amendment guarantees.2 8 The court viewed these decisions as
indicative of a statutory policy protecting an alien's right to work.2 9
After analyzing the textual difference between the 1870 Act and the
1866 Act, the legislative discussion indicating that aliens were
included in the phrase "all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States" and the decisions protecting an alien's right to work
under the fourteenth amendment, the court concluded that aliens are
within the scope of section 1981.30 The court next questioned
whether section 1981 was an appropriate basis for a suit alleging
private discrimination. While acknowledging that the 1870 Act was
enacted pursuant to the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and,

(1886) (discriminatory enforcement of a municipal ordinance). Each of these
cases involved state statutes or ordinances that either discriminated against aliens
or were enforced discriminately against aliens. This discrimination was declared
violative of the equal protection clause.

25.

CONG. GLOBE,

S. 365, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870).

26. Id.
27. Id. Although this particular bill was never considered by the Senate,
Senator Stewart of Nevada, who introduced it, succeeded in amending with his
proposed bill a House of Representatives bill designed to enforce the fifteenth
amendment. This amended bill, again including the words "all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States" rather than the words "all persons born in the
United States" of the 1866 Act, became the Civil Rights Act of 1870, with
Senator Stewart's amendment constituting § § 16-18 of the Act. Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, § § 16-18, 16 Stat. 144.
28. See note 24 supra.
29. 350 F. Supp. at 536.
30. 350 F. Supp. at 536.
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therefore, would require state action for the maintenance of a suit, the
court pointed out that section 18 of the 1870 Act expressly required
that section 16 of the 1870 Act (the origin of section 1981) be
enforced under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
court noted that the 1866 Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in the Jones decision, 3 ' has no state action requirement and that
Congress had the power under the thirteenth amendment to outlaw
public and private discrimination. Based on these considerations, the
court held that section 1981 permits an alien to bring an action for
private employment discrimination. 2
The instant case is the first to extend the prohibitions of section
1981 to nonracial private discrimination. In light of the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, this decision is correct. The
statements by some courts that section 1981 applies only to racial
discrimination are dicta. The courts in those cases were confronted
with suits brought by women for sex discrimination,33 White union
members for employment discrimination3 4 ' and Seneca Indians for
alleged violation of their civil rights.3 These cases hold only that the
plaintiffs in each case are not members of the class intended to be
protected by section 1981. Therefore, the statement by each of the
courts in the above cases that section 1981 applies only to racial
discrimination must be considered dicta and seems clearly wrong in
light of the Guerra decision. The instant decision presents a convincing
argument that aliens are protected by section 1981. The decision also
takes on added significance in light of Espinoza,3 ' which held that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit private
employment discrimination based solely on alien status. If plaintiff's
action under section 1981 had been dismissed, aliens would have no
remedy for private employment discrimination, and such discrimination might thereby be promoted. Finally, this decision further
implements the policy of extending to lawfully admitted aliens a
substantial portion of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In
Truax v. Raich,37 decided on equal protection grounds, the Supreme
31. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
32. 350 F. Supp. at 538.
33. Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
34. Marshall v. Plumbers Local 60, 343 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972).
35. Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, 348 F. Supp. 51
(W.D.N.Y. 1972).
36. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Truax involved an Arizona statute that regulated
employment opportunities on the basis of citizenship. Eighty per cent of all
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Court stated that the right to a livelihood is the essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity protected by the fourteenth
amendment,3 8 and that aliens are included in this constitutional
guarantee. Although Guerra is based on thirteenth amendment
grounds, a strong analogy can be drawn to the Truax decision because
the purpose of both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments is to
eliminate discrimination. Congress, through the exercise of its power
under the thirteenth amendment, has included aliens within the
protected class. The Guerra decision, when coupled with the decisions
under the fourteenth amendment, secures for aliens the equal
opportunities in employment essential to successful residency in the
United States.
Mark M. Greisberger

workers in establishments employing five or more workers were required to be
United States citizens or resident aliens for a specified length of time. Plaintiff,
faced with the loss of his job, brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of this
statute. The Supreme Court struck down this statute as violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
38. 239 U.S. at 41.
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OF THE EEC TREATY APPLIES TO CERTAIN
CHANGES IN INTERNAL CORPORATE STRUCTURE

ANTITRUST-ARTICLE 86

The Commission of the European Communities (Commission)
initiated a proceeding under article 861 of the Treaty of the European
Economic Community (EEC) to determine whether Continental Can
Co., Inc., U.S.A. (Continental) had violated the antitrust rules of the
EEC by its acquisition of Thomassen and Drijver-Verblifa N.V.
(T.D.V.), a Dutch packaging firm, and the subsequent merger of
T.D.V. with Schmalback-Lubeca-Werke A.G. (S.L.W.), a German
packaging producer controlled by Continental. Acting through a
holding company incorporated in the United States, Europemballage
Corporation (Europemballage), Continental had acquired a 91 per
cent interest in T.D.V. after contributing its 85 per cent interest in
S.L.W. to the holding company. Europemballage thus had merged the
largest producer of light metal containers in continental Europe,
S.W.L., and the largest manufacturer of metal containers in the
Benelux countries, T.D.V. The Commission contended that the
acquisition of T.D.V. by Europemballage constituted an abuse of
Continental's "dominant position"2 in the EEC since the acquisition
eliminated actual and potential competition in a substantial part of
the EEC and reinforced Continental's financial, economic and

1. The following is the English text of article 86 of the EEC Treaty, which
became authentic on January 1, 1973: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may
affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a)
directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts."
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 86,
2101 (1973) (authentic English
298 U.N.T.S. 3, in I CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
text) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2. In Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte, 2 CCH COMM.
8106 (1971) (English translation), the European Court of Justice
MKT. REP.
defined "dominant position" as a market position in which a producer or group of
producers has the ability to prevent effective competition on an important part of
the relevant market, taking into account the existence of any other producers
selling similar products and their positions in the market.
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technical capacities to maintain its dominant position. 3 Continental
argued that the Commission had not established that Continental
occupied a dominant position because the Commission had failed to
define properly the relevant product market.4 Continental also
contended that the Commission had failed to show that T.D.V. and
S.L.W. occupied the same geographic market, a prerequisite to a
finding of elimination of competition. Finally, Continental attacked
the Commission's reliance on article 86 as an antimerger provision;
Continental contended that the provision was intended to prevent
companies from abusing existing market positions by external market
practices rather than to block mergers.' In an original proceeding the
Commission held that Continental had violated article 866 and
ordered Continental to terminate the merger. On appeal, the European
Court of Justice, held, reversed. The enhancement of a dominant
market position that results in the elimination of actual or potential
competition in a relevant product market throughout a substantial
part of the EEC is an abuse of that position; this abuse does constitute
a violation of article 86, but the Commission must prove that no
sufficient counterbalance can be provided by the remaining competitors. Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. The Commission of the European Community, 2 CCH Co MM. MK T. RErP.
8171
7
(1973).
Under article 668 of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) Treaty, the forerunner of the EEC Treaty, all mergers were
subject to prior approval by the ECSC High Authority (now absorbed

3. The Commission contended that Continental held a dominant position in
the EEC because S.L.W. occupied a dominant position in the Federal Republic of
Germany and Continental controlled S.L.W.
4. Continental further contended that its market position was not properly
characterized because the Commission had failed to account for flexibility of the
market, ease of entry and potential competitors in related markets.
5. Prior to the completion of this merger, the Commission had warned T.D.V.,
S.L.W. and Continental that the contemplated merger might violate article 86, and
it called the legal and financial consequences that might result from the finding of
a violation to the attention of these parties.
6. 8 E.E.C. J.O. 25 (1972). For an unofficial English translation see 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.

9481 (1972).

7. The official opinion is not yet available.
8. The following is the applicable section of article 66 of the European Coal
and Steel Community Treaty: "1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 below, any
transaction which would have in itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing
about a concentration, within the territories mentioned in the first paragraph of
Article 79, involving enterprises of which at least one is subject to the application
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in the EEC Commission). Article 86 of the EEC Treaty contains no
prohibition of corporate consolidations. 9 Nevertheless, the Commission gradually has laid the groundwork for the application of article
86 to corporate combinations. In 1965, the Commission pronounced
the basic criteria for the determination of an unlawful merger. The
determination is based on two predominant factors:' 0 first, whether
either of the combining enterprises occupies a dominant market
position in a substantial portion of the EEC; and secondly, whether
there has been an abusive exploitation of that position by virtue of the
combination."' Discussing the conditions under which the exercise of
a trademark right is prohibited by article 86, in Sirena S.r.l v. Eda
GmbH 2 the European Court of Justice defined dominant position as
the power to prevent the maintenance of effective competition in a
substantial part of the relevant market, considering the existence and
position of producers and distributors that market similar goods.
Enterprises are found to occupy a dominant position, therefore, when,
as a result of their market shares and their access to economic,

of Article 80, shall be submitted to a prior authorization of the High Authority.
This obligation shall be effective whether the transaction in question is carried out
by a person or an enterprise, or a group of persons or enterprises, whether it
concerns a single product or different products, whether it is effected by merger,
acquisition of shares or assets, loan, contract, or any other means of control. For
the application of the above provisions, the High Authority will define by a
general regulation, drawn up after consulting the Council, what constitutes
control of an enterprise." Treaty Establishing the European Coal Community, in

W.

FREIDMANN, ANTI-TRUST LAW

579, 581 (1956).

9. Since the EEC desired the rapid economic expansion inherent in corporate
acquisitions and mergers, a scheme of statutory merger control was not
incorporated into the EEC Treaty. See R. JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND
ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION

293 (1970).

10. Concentration of Firms in the Common Market, [1965-1969 Transfer
Binder] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9081, at 8171 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum on Concentration].
11. Enterprises must occupy both the same product and same geographical
markets, and they must hold the dominant position in these markets before article
86 will apply. The product market is defined by functional interchangeability, i.e.
all products that may reasonably be employed for the same purpose. The
geographical market is confined to the Common Market boundaries and must
constitute a substantial part of the Common Market. See C. OBERDORFER, A.
GLEISS, & M. HIRscH, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW
206, at 206
(1963).

12. For an unofficial English translation see 2 CCH
8101 (1972).
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financial and technical resources, they can act independently of
competitors, buyers or suppliers. 3 The Commission's Memorandum
on Concentration was the first official indication that the mere
combination and resulting elimination of competition by a dominant
firm constituted abusive market behavior under article 86.14 Previously, only external predatory practices, such as those listed in article 86,
or, at most, predatory practices. used by" a dominant firm to force a
merger, were thought to constitute abusive market behavior by a
dominant firm.'" In recent years, the Commission and the Court have
held various external market practices by enterprises to be abusive of
their dominant position. In proceedings against the Gesellschaft fir
musikalische Ausffihrungs-und mechanische Vervielfiltigungsrechte
(GEMA), 16 a German company holding copyrights on musical works,
the Commission considered abusive horizontal practices. The Commission found that the following practices constitute abuse of a dominant
position: discriminating against citizens of other Member States of the
EEC; placing unreasonable restrictions on the rights of members to
join other associations; impeding the creation of a continental market
for services; and discriminating against importers and imports in favor
of national producers.1 7 In an action initiated at the request of
Laboratorio Chimico Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja S.p.A. (Zoja), against
Commercial Solvents Corporation (C.S.C.) and its wholly owned
Italian subsidiary, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano (I.C.I.),' 8 the
Commission held that a refusal by I.C.I. to sell primary materials to
Zoja"9 was an abusive exploitation of a vertically integrated dominant

13. For a discussion of the relevant market in applications of article 86 see C.
OBERDORFER,

A.

GLEISS,

& M.

HIRSCH, COMMON

MARKET

CARTEL

LAW 206 (1963).
14. Memorandum on Concentration,supra note 10, at 8173.
15. R. JOLIET, supra note 9, at 286-87.
16. 15 E.E.C. J.O. 134 (1971); 22 E.E.C. J.O. 166 (1972). For an unofficial
English translation see [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9438 (1971).
17. See Brown, Report to the Monte Carlo Conference on Topic No. 6:
IndustrialGrowth and Antitrust, 1972 INT'L BAR J. 93, 99.
18. 51 E.E.C. J.O. 299 (1972). For an unofficial English summary see 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
9543 (1972).
19. C.S.C. and its subsidiary I.C.I. established a dominant position in the
production of nitropropane and the marketing of its derivative amino butanol,
which is used in drugs for the treatment of tuberculosis. Zoja was I.C.l.'s principal
client for amino butanol. I.C.I. refused to sell the product to Zoja and Zoja was
unable to locate another supplier. As a result, Zoja was forced out of the market.
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position occupied by C.S.C. and I.C.I.2 Furthermore, the Commission
alleged in an action against the principal sugar enterprises in the EEC 2
that unilateral measures2 2 taken by the producers to reinforce the
existing division of markets among themselves constituted an abuse of
their dominant position in the EEC. These instances of abuse of a
dominant position exclusively concerned external market practices;
the instant action is the first suit the Commission has brought under
the theory that a corporate combination and the resulting elimination
of competition by a dominant firm constitute abusive market behavior
under article 86.
In the instant case, the Court confirmed the interpretation of article
86 rendered by the Commission in its original proceeding but reversed
the original decision because the Commission failed to establish that
Continental and its subsidiaries occupied a dominant market position
in a substantial part of the EEC. First, the Court found that the three
separate legal entities of S.L.W., Europemballage and Continental were
merged into one economic unit over which the Court was competent
to exercise jurisdiction in an antitrust case. 2 3 In its interpretation of
article 86, the Court rejected the argument that control of corporate
mergers is not within the ambit of the provision. The Court considered
the suggestion that the prohibitions of article 86 should be directed
solely toward external market practices rather than changes in the
internal structure of an enterprise. The Court, however, rejected this
interpretation of article 86 since internal structural changes in an
enterprise may have significant external market effects. To support its

20. For an analysis of the effects of such abuses see P.
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

AREEDA,

521-23 (1967).

21. Press Release from the Commission of the European Communities,
[1970-1972 Transfer Binder] 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9522 (1972)
(unofficial CCH translation).
22. In its complaint, the Commission listed a number of restrictive measures:
intra-Community trade in sugar intended for human consumption was carried on
only between the principal producers; deliveries of such sugar to dealers and to
processing industries in other Member States were either refused or authorized
only at higher prices; and participation in tenders for export refunds, as provided
for under the Community system, took place only after the principal enterprises
agreed to act in concert.
23. The Court considered and dismissed several threshold arguments by
Continental. Continental argued that the Commission handed down its decision in
the wrong language, that the Commission did not give notice of the proceedings to
Continental through diplomatic channels and that the Commission did not have
jurisdiction over Continental. See 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8171, at 8284
(1973).
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liberal interpretation of article 86, the Court relied on general
principles of economic policy contained in articles 2 and 3 of the EEC
Treaty and placed substantial emphasis on the Court's duty to
establish "a system ensuring that competition in the common market
is not distorted." 24 In addition, the Court recognized that if article 86
is literally interpreted a gap apparently exists between the antitrust
coverage of articles 8525 and 86, i.e. ends prohibited by article 85
might be accomplished by means that are allowable under article 86.26
The Court determined that article 86 should be interpreted to
complement article 85 since the purposes of the articles are
identical-the maintenance of workable competition within the

24. EEC Treaty, art. 3(f), 1 CCH

COMM. MKT. REP.

171, at 211 (1973).

25. Article 85 provides that:
"1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;

(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; -any
decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; -any concerted
practice or category of concerted practices; which contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which
does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question." EEC Treaty, art. 85, 1
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2051, at 1661 (1973).
26. For example, a single enterprise, through a dominant market position,
may control a market share that a group of enterprises would not be allowed to
control under the provisions of article 85.
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Common Market.2" Even though it interpreted article 86 liberally, the
Court held for Continental because the Commission failed to establish
that Continental held a dominant market position in the EEC. The
Court's holding was based on its consideration of four distinct factors:
the market share for the relevant products held by the enterprise after
the merger; the relative size of the new unit formed by the merger in
comparison with the size of any competitors in that market; the
economic strength of buyers in relation to the economic strength of
the new unit; and the potential competition from producers of the
same products in other geographical markets or from producers of
other products within the Common Market.2 8 Although S.L.W. had
occupied a very large market share in the manufacture of metal
containers in Germany, the Court noted that this market position may
have been diluted by competition from substitute products such as
glass and plastic containers. The Court then determined that the
Commission had failed to establish either that the metal container
industry was impervious to such competition, especially in light of the
accessibility of that market, or that a reasonable basis existed for
considering the metal container industry as a separate submarket from
other container industries in the application of the provisions of
article 86.29 Finally, the Court found that the Commission had failed
to establish that T.D.V. and S.L.W. shared the same geographical
market sphere.
In this decision, the Court fashioned a concrete antimerger
precedent that gives new life to a previously ineffective provision. In
order to broaden the scope of article 86, the Court was forced to
disregard the argument that article 86 was not intended to control
mergers since it did not contain the merger control provisions of
article 66 of the ECSC Treaty.3" Implicitly, the Court's liberal

27. Arguments against this interpretation, based on a comparison of article 86
with article 66 of the ECSC Treaty, were dismissed by the Court without
explanation.
28. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8171, at 8301 (1973).
29. For a description of submarket analysis see United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
30. While article 85 incorporated the substance of its predecessor provision,
article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, article 86 did not contain the merger control
provisions found in article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. Yet, under the Court's
interpretation, article 86 would operate against mergers in much the same fashion
as article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. Further, it appears on the face of article 86 that
the provision is not hostile to the mere creation or existence of market power.
Changes in internal corporate structure are not included among the prohibited
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interpretation probably was motivated by the pressures of two
substantial economic and political conditions: the economic necessity
to inhibit the movement of market concentration that menaces the
existence of a healthy economic climate in the EEC; and, the virtual
political impossibility of obtaining an amendment to the EEC Treaty
that would provide for effective control of economic concentration.
The Court explicitly adopted a liberal interpretation of article 86 to
place the provision within the context of the general policy of the
EEC Treaty and to enable the article to be utilized as a complement to
article 85. Although the Court relied heavily on the policy considerations of articles 2 and 3, article 86 was not designed to accomplish
effectively the purpose outlined in article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty, i.e.
to insure that competition in the Common Market is not distorted.3
Even with the Court's liberal interpretation, the provision is insufficient to insure a balanced policy toward economic concentration.3 2
Article 86 is too narrow in scope to meet the challenge of a
conglomerate concentration in which no single enterprise would
occupy a dominant position in any one product market. Large
concentrations of economic power could be effected through the
acquisition of unrelated small- and medium-sized enterprises. Under
the strict standards of proof required by the Court, the provision is a
patently unsuitable means of counteracting the creation and consolidation of market power.33 Furthermore, the Court's interpretation
maintains a tenuous distinction between establishing or creating a
dominant market position, a permitted course of action, and reinforcing or defending an existing dominant position, a prohibited
course of action. 4 The vagueness of the law in this area may
discourage the attempts of smaller firms to reach optimum size and
thus may inhibit the "continuous and balanced expansion" of
enterprises to levels of economies of scale and increased competi-

practices mentioned by the article and the article fails to provide for exceptions as
does article 85. See R. JOLIET, supra note 9, at 290-93; Markert, Antitrust
Aspects of Mergers in the EEC, 5 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 32,46-47 (1969).
31. See R. JOLIET, supra note 9, at 290-93.
32. For a discussion of this disability see Mestm~cker, Concentration and
Competition in the EEC, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 37 (1973).
33. It is obvious under the standard of proof required by the Court that the
Commission will have to be extremely selective in its enforcement of article 86.
The Commission simply does not have the resources to attack and prove every
violation of the provision.
34. See R. JOLIET, supra note 9,at 290-93.
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tion.3" Nevertheless, the Court, in the face of the dangers of legislative
inaction, has fashioned a stop-gap measure that implements basic
treaty policy3 6 consistent with changing circumstances3" and puts
corporate investors on notice that they must direct their expansion
investment through channels that will insure that competition in the
Common Market is not distorted.
RichardP. Granfield

35. Cf. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), in which the
combination of small markets to compete with chain markets was held to violate
§ 7 of the Clayton Act.
36. For an explanation of the political background of the EEC Treaty see W.
KITZINGER, THE

POLITICS AND

ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRA-

1-96 (1963).
37. There are three important changes in circumstances that may form the
basis for a liberal interpretation of article 86: the needs of the Community-in
addition to encouraging rapid economic expansion through mergers and acquisitions, the Community must presently inhibit harmful market concentration; the
structure of the Community-as the Community has become more politically and
economically interdependent, the role of the Court has been enhanced so that it
may fashion expansive interpretations of the Treaty consistent with changes in the
needs of the Community; and the nature of corporate mergers--the large
multinational corporation has attained such size and power that it is imperative
that some means be employed to regulate the ability of large corporations to
make acquisitions that are harmful to a competitive economic climate.
TION
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXECUTIVE POWER-PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE
TO

FOREIGN

FOREIGN COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS PURSUANT

AFFAIRS POWER

IS NOT CIRCUMSCRIBED

ABSENT EX-

PLICIT LEGISLATION

Plaintiff, a consumer organization, sought a declaratory judgment
and an injunction against the Secretary of State1 and several major
foreign steel companies2 who participated in a steel import limitation
agreement. 3 At the direction of the President 4 the Secretary of State
had initiated negotiations between the steel companies to reduce the
importation of foreign steel into the United States. Plaintiff contended that the President and the Secretary of State lack the authority
either to initiate or to encourage these arrangements because the
Executive cannot negotiate any agreement that is prohibited by the
antitrust laws as a restraint of trade, and the arrangements contravene
specific procedures established by the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.' Plaintiff also contended that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act' and
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 constitute a comprehensive
preemption of unilateral presidential action in the area of the
regulation of competition in foreign commerce. Defendants argued
that the foreign affairs power of the President empowered him to
negotiate these arrangements; and that since the Sherman Act and the

1. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Julius Katz was also included as a party
defendant.
2. Nine Japanese steel corporations, the British Steel Corp. and various
Western European steel manufacturers belonging to the European Coal and Steel
Community were involved. These companies account for 85% of United States
steel imports.
3. The Voluntary Restraint Arrangements on Steel were finalized in May 1972
and were to extend through 1974. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
4. The arrangements were made collectively among the steel companies. Since
the United States was not a party to any of the agreements, the case does not
concern the President's power to enter into executive agreements in restraint of
trade with private companies. The issue is the presidential power to negotiate and
encourage the agreements among these companies.
5. 76 Stat. 872 (codified in scattered sections of 19, 26 U.S.C.). The
procedures allegedly contravened are found in 19 U.S.C. § § 1862, 1981 and
1982. Plaintiff initially alleged that the arrangements also violated the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, but withdrew this contention with prejudice. Thus the issue
whether the President can unilaterally exempt private foreign corporations from
the antitrust laws was not before the court.
6. 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Sherman Act].
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Trade Expansion Act are only general legislation concerning trade
agreements and the regulation of competition, they cannot be read as
an explicit preemption of the President's foreign affairs power. The
District Court for the District of Columbia, held, the procedures
established in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 are not exclusive.
When no explicit legislation circumscribes presidential action, the
President has the authority to encourage commercial agreements with
foreign companies pursuant to his foreign affairs power. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319
(D.D.C. 1973).
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Pursuant to this power,
Congress passed the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of interstate and foreign commerce.' The literal wording of the Sherman Act encompasses every
commercial contract and combination; 8 the Supreme Court, therefore, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States9 enunciated the "rule of
reason"-a restraint violates the Sherman Act only if it is "unreasonable." The Court modified the rule of reason in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co. 10 by enunciating the "per se" rule whereby
certain restraints, such as price-fixing, are presumed conclusively to be
unreasonable." Although these cases involved domestic violations of
the Sherman Act, the Court declared in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States 2 that the Sherman Act also applies to restraints of
foreign commerce.' 3 Congress also has delegated much of its power in
the area of foreign commerce to the Executive. For example, the

7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970).
8. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). See United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (§ 1 of the Sherman Act
held to condemn "every" restraint of trade with no exceptions).
9. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
10. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
11. 273 U.S. at 396-97. Defendants, therefore, are not allowed to introduce
evidence that the anticompetitive impact of the restraint is outweighed by any
social or economic benefit derived from the restraint.
12. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
13. 341 U.S. at 599. While Timken involved a domestic corporation and its
subsidiaries acting in restraint of foreign commerce, United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945), established that foreign
persons acting outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States may be
subject to liability if their actions contravene the antitrust laws and are intended
to affect foreign commerce. Accord, Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962).
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Trade Agreements Act of 193414 and the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 authorized the President to enter foreign trade agreements."5 The Sherman Act, however, made no delegation of power.
In addition to congressional delegations, the President possesses
powers independent of Congress in foreign affairs'" and foreign
commerce.' 7 Although extensive presidential powers over foreign
relations have long been asserted,' 8 the first judicial recognition of
these powers was announced in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport
Corp."' Mr. Justice Sutherland stated, in dictum, that the President
has plenary and exclusive power as "the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations ....,20 Although
14. 48 Stat. 943, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § § 1001, 1201, 1351-54 (1970).
15. The President's authority under the Trade Agreements Act to enter into
foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or their instrumentalities for
the purpose of expanding markets for United States products lapsed in 1962. 19
U.S.C. § 1352 (1970). Similar authority was granted the President under the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, but that power lapsed in 1967. 19 U.S.C. § 1821
(1970). The President still possesses the power to adjust tariffs after a finding by
the Tariff Commission that such action is warranted. 19 U.S.C. § 1902 (1970).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
17. The President's foreign affairs power was declared to extend into the area
of foreign commerce in Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103 (1948). In that case, the Supreme Court considered the possibility of
judicial review of the Civil Aeronautics Board's determination on applications by
civilian carriers to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation and commerce.
The Board's decisions were subject to approval by the President under § 801 of
the Civil Aeronautics Act. The Court noted that the President's power of review
drew validity from either the congressional delegation of power or the inherent
power of the President in foreign affairs. 333 U.S. at 109-10. The statement of the
extent of the President's foreign affairs power is dictum, however, because the
Court upheld the congressional delegation of power; but the Court did place great
emphasis on the inherent powers of the President in sustaining presidential action.
18. Alexander Hamilton wrote that the foreign affairs power is incident to the
"executive function" and the other enumerated powers of the President.
Hamilton expressed this theory in the "Pacificus Papers," which was written in
support of Washington's unilateral proclamation of neutrality. E. CORWIN, THE

179, 426 n.31 (4th ed. 1957). In 1908, Woodrow Wilson wrote:
"One of the President's powers is ...his control, which is very absolute, of the
foreign relations of the nation." Quoted in L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 304 n.33 (1972). See generally id. at 37-65. Of
course, these early assertions did not go unchallenged. See E. CORWIN at 180-81.
19. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
20. 299 U.S. at 320. The statement is dictum because the case involved
congressional delegation of power and not the power of the President acting

PRESIDENT
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the constitutional underpinnings of the President's foreign affairs
power have been questioned,2 1 in reality the President possesses
broad, albeit undefined, power over the area.22 When constitutional
power is vested in coordinate branches of government, the question
arises whether the power of one branch preempts the concurrent
power of the other branch.23 In Shurtleff v. United States, 24 the
Supreme Court declared that the existence of a general power in
Congress to rescind the President's power of removal should not be
held to preempt the President's use of his concurrent power to remove
executive officials absent a clear expression of congressional intent to
do so. 25 Analogous to the preemption problem in Shurtleff is Parker
v. Brown,26 which involved the applicability of the Sherman Act to
the concurrent commerce powers of the state and federal governments. In Parker,the Court held that the power of a state legislature to
enact a price stabilization program could not be nullified impliedly by
the mere existence of the unexercized power in Congress to prohibit
such actions.2" In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,28 the

alone. Justice Sutherland also cited John Marshall's statement in the House of
Representatives: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." 299 U.S. at 319. The
statement, however, was taken out of the context in which Marshall used it. 10
ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800). Sutherland used it to support his broadened
concept of executive power in foreign affairs. See L. HENKIN, supra note 18, at
300 n.18; Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of ForeignRelations, 71 MicH. L.
REV. 1, 15-17 (1972).
21. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 18, at 37-44; Berger, note 20 supra.
22. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937). See generally E. CORWIN, supra note 18, at 204-06; L. HENKIN,
supra note 18, at 44-50.
23. The issue of preemption by one branch of government when concurrent
power in both branches is involved (e.g., congressional commerce power and
presidential foreign affairs power) has not been heavily litigated. As the court
noted in the instant case, the judiciary will avoid deciding issues that concern the
allocation of power between the political branches of government unless a clearly
justiciable controversy arises. 352 F. Supp. at 1322. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962).
24. 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
25. 189 U.S. at 315. The Court assumed, for the purposes of the case, that
Congress has the concurrent power to condition the removal of executive officials.
189 U.S. at 314.
26. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
27. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
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Court held that the President lacked the authority under his war
powers to seize the steel mills without congressional authorization.
The critical factor for four justices of the majority was Congress's
explicit denial of this power to the President. 9 Similarly in United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,3" the Fourth Circuit invalidated an
executive agreement with Canada because it contravened express
congressional regulations concerning the procedures that the President
must follow when imposing import restrictions. 1 The inference to be
drawn from these decisions is that in areas of concurrent authority in
coordinate branches of government Congress must expressly act to
preempt Executive power.
In the instant case, the court acknowledged that the President is
prohibited from acting in contravention of legislation preempting the
area of foreign commerce.3 2 The court observed, however, that while
the President had failed to follow the procedures established by the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, nothing in the Act made its procedures
exclusive. 3 Noting that the Sherman Act, as general legislation,
exhibits no congressional intent to preempt the President's "independent authority over foreign commerce," 3 4 the court concluded
that while these Acts are comprehensive in scope, they do not contain
the explicit language necessary to preempt the President's inherent
foreign affairs powers. The court then observed, in dicta, that the
actions of the private participants to the arrangements are subject to
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act notwithstanding executive
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's [legislative] control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 317 U.S. at
351.
28. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
29. 343 U.S. at 603 (Frankfurter, J.), 639 (Jackson, J.), 660 (Burton, J.), 662
(Clark, J.). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 18, at n.11.
30. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296
(1955).
31. By way of dicta the court denied that the President has any concurrent
power in the area of foreign commerce (204 F.2d at 658), but this position was
not affirmed by the Supreme Court. The holding of the case left open the
question of the power of the Executive to enter into trade agreements when there
has been no congressional action. 204 F.2d at 659-60. See generally L. HEN KIN,
supra note 18, at 180-81, 186.
32. 352 F. Supp. at 1322.
33. 352 F. Supp. at 1322.
34. 352 F Supp. at 1323. By citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
as the sole authority for this proposition, while calling attention to the specific
factual situation in that case, the court apparently suggested that Congress must
act expressly to deny the President power in foreign affairs.
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involvement in the negotiations." The court therefore determined
that the President has no authority to exempt arrangements from the
operation of the Sherman Act because, as executor of the laws,
he
6
cannot contravene the legislatively established national policy.

The importance of the court's holding is its limited scope. Since the
President did not enter into an "executive agreement," the only
presidential power affirmed by the court was the power to encourage
and negotiate international trade agreements, regardless whether these
agreements violate the Sherman Act. Unless Congress explicitly
prohibits such presidential actions, the President's power to negotiate
is the direct consequence of his role as the "sole organ" in foreign
relations. The contents of such arrangements, however, still are subject
to preemption by congressional legislation, 7 and the court in the
instant case clearly indicated that the present agreements are
preempted by, and subject to, the Sherman Act.38 Thus while the
Sherman Act does not preempt presidential power to negotiate foreign
trade agreements, it does preempt presidential power to exempt the
agreements from the operation of the Act. The granting of exemptions
to the antitrust laws is historically a function reserved to Congress.3 9 Congress has specifically authorized presidential actions similar to those taken in the present case and has exempted the private
parties involved from the antitrust laws.40 The government's argu35. 352 F. Supp. at 1323. The court further implied that the agreements
probably violate the Act. 352 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
36. 352 F. Supp. at 1323.
37. See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
38. "A flat agreement among private foreign producers mutually to limit a
substantial amount of goods to be sold in the United States is a violation of the
Sherman Act . ... " 352 F. Supp. at 1323; accord, United States v. National Lead

Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
39. See, e.g., 63 F. Supp. at 526; Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 61-65
(1964) (exempts from the operation of the antitrust laws agreements or acts
entered into in the course of, and for the sole purpose of engaging in, the export
trade). The Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), added two
provisos to § 1 of the Sherman Act that exempt agreements setting minimum
resale prices for trademarked or brand name commodities from the Sherman Act
and from § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
40. 31 U.S.C. § § 931-38 (1970). Section 932(a) of the Act grants to the
President the power to stimulate voluntary agreements with private persons for
the purposes of curtailing the expansion of the private flow of dollar funds from
the United States and of aiding in the improvement of the United States' balance
of payments. Pursuant to these purposes, subsections (b) and (c) provide antitrust
exemptions to all persons who enter into such voluntary arrangements pursuant to
presidential initiative.
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ment in the instant case places unwarranted reliance on Parker v.
Brown4 1 because in that case federalism was the sole issue.42 The
present conflict, however, is between the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government. While the President has the power
to execute existing legislation, he is powerless to act contrary to
existing legislation. 4 3 To allow the President unilaterally to create
exemptions to the Sherman Act would constitute an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative function." On the other hand, to subject
the private defendants to treble-damage actions under the Sherman
Act would invite protests and possible commercial retaliation from the
governments of the foreign nationals. Two possible solutions to the
dilemma are available. One solution is judicial application of the rule
of reason to the actions of the private corporations. In Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, the Court denied the defense of
reasonableness but did not state that defendants' actions were subject
to the per se rule.45 The per se rule is a judicially created rule of

41. Brief for Apellant at 28-35. The Sherman Act does not prohibit "a state
or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature" but a "state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful ... ." Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
42. The Court in Parker also emphasized that the division of markets and
price-fixing system established by California was approved because it was passed
pursuant to the state's legislative authority. The California prorate program
"derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state
and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command."
317 U.S. at 350.
43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1. This statement does not apply, of
course, when Congress lacks the constitutional power to act. Compare Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), with Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953); Note, Steel Imports:
Congressional Limits on Executive Recourse to Voluntary Export Restraint
Agreements, 4 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 110, 125 (1972).
45. 341 U.S. at 599. "Although the Supreme Court in the Timken case
rejected a claim of 'reasonableness' by the defendants, who had eliminated
competition among themselves in England, France, and the United States,
defendant's claim was unpersuasive in view of the finding that competition was
possible and would have occurred absent the long-standing restraint." P.
AREEDA,

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 68 n.204 (1967). Thus, Areeda suggests,

Timken need not be read as requiring that the per se rule automatically be applied
to international conduct. See Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L.
REV. 569,591-92 (1954).
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convenience, 46 not a legislative creature; as such it is subject to
judicial amendment without legislative authorization. The application
of the rule of reason in cases of international violations of the
antitrust laws would acknowledge the difference in the structures of
international and domestic markets. 47 Thus the artificial presumptions of the per se rule,48 which were fashioned for domestic
problems, would not be imposed on an economic structure for which
the rule is neither designed nor suited. 49 The other possible solution is
congressional action ratifying the President's implicit guarantee to the

46. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
47. Areeda states that per se rules are used domestically because the conduct
circumscribed is, generally, potentially dangerous and of no redeeming value,
while these presumptions lose their validity in an international context where the
same conduct might even be beneficial. P. AREEDA, supra note 45, at 67-68.
48. The per se rule developed because, although the Sherman Act had been
construed to preclude only "unreasonable" restraints of trade, "there are
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by
the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also
avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged investigation...
to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable ...
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added).
49. "[D]ivision of territory [is not] so self-operating a category of Sherman
Law violations as to dispense with analysis of the practical consequences of what
on paper is a geographic division of territory .... Of course, it is not for this
Court to formulate economic policy as to foreign commerce. But the conditions
controlling foreign commerce may be relevant here. When as a matter of cold fact
the legal, financial, and governmental policies deny opportunities for exportation
from this country and importation into it, arrangements that afford such
opportunities to American enterprise may not fall under the ban of a fair
construction of the Sherman Law because comparable arrangements regarding
domestic commerce come within its condemnation." Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In the
present case, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prevented the
President from seeking and making formal agreements with foreign countries,
who, of course, do not fall within the scope of the antitrust laws. See American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Cf. 341 U.S. at 608
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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parties of the legality of the agreements."0 Such congressional action
would exempt those who entered into these agreements, and it would
eliminate the potential conflict between the United States and
governments of the steel producers.
Donald B. Cameron, Jr.

50. Such a statute would ratify the power of the President to grant antitrust
exemptions to all persons who entered into these agreements pursuant to
presidential initiative. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § § 931-38 (1970); note 40 supra. It is well
established that Congress has the power to ratify prior unauthorized official
conduct of government officers, thus giving these actions the force of law. Swayne
& Holt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1937); United States v.
Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the
Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 704 (1960).
Such retroactive ratification is permissible even if judicial action is pending on the
matter. 206 U.S. at 387; Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 703-06, 717-18 (1960). The
court in the instant case held that, while the President had the power to negotiate,
the results of that negotiation could not contravene congressional legislation. The
effect of a statute such as the one suggested would be to legitimate these results.
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EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-SECTION 10(b)

APPLIES TO A TRANSACTION IN UNLISTED FOREIGN SECURITIES WHEN
SIGNIFICANT FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OCCURS IN THE UNITED STATES

Plaintiff, an American conglomerate,' sought damages from
defendants, British citizens and corporations, 2 for losses resulting
from plaintiff's purchases of shares of a British company listed on the
London Stock Exchange. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, by making
false and misleading statements concerning financial data and the
recent profitability of defendants' various activities, had conspired to
induce plaintiff's purchases of the shares and thus violated section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' Plaintiff further
claimed that many of these misrepresentations had occurred in New
4
York during negotiations for a takeover of the British corporation.
Defendants sought dismissal on the grounds that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the transactions were
1. There were two plaintiffs: Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation
and Leasco World Trade Company (U.K.), Ltd. The reasons for joining the latter
were not apparent. At trial in the district court, Leasco Data is to be joined by
Leasco International N.V., which is a Netherlands Antilles corporation, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Leasco Data and the party who made the actual stock
purchases in London on Leasco Data's behalf.
2. Defendants were Pergamon Press, Ltd., a large British publishing house
with diversified subsidiaries (some of whom were also defendants), Pergamon's
founder Robert Maxwell, various Pergamon executives, a firm of London
solicitors and a British accounting firm.
3. Plaintiffs argued that the district court had personal jurisdiction under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). Section 27
provides, inter alia, that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce
liabilities created by the Act and that suit on these liabilities may be brought in
the district in which any act constituting the violation occurred or in which the
defendant is found, is an inhabitant or transacts business. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), makes it unlawful, inter alia, for any
person, through the use of any instrumentality of interstate commerce, "[t] o use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ...any
manipulative or deceptive device" in contravention of the rules prescribed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." Plaintiffs also alleged violations of
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972), but this allegation had no effect on
the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
4. The following are relevant portions of the district court's summary of the
complex facts: "Negotiations [for the takeover] took place both in England and
in New York. Two rounds of discussion are particularly important... : the first
occurred in England, over a four-day period in early June 1969, and the second in
New York shortly thereafter ....The negotiations culminated in an agreement
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foreign in all material respects' and that, in any event, choice of law

principles favored application of English law.6 Interpreting the Second
Circuit's decision in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook' to require only a
showing of "substantial impact" on an American securities market, the
district court denied defendant's motions.' On interlocutory appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held,
affirmed on other grounds.' When fraudulent conduct in connection

executed by Leasco and Maxwell on June 17 in New York, providing in relevant
part for (a) the purchase by Leasco of Pergamon stock from Maxwell; [and] (b) a
tender offer by Leasco for the stock of Pergamon held by the public ....
Following the execution of the June 17th agreement, Leasco purchased on the
open market [the London Stock Exchange] over 5,000,000 shares of Pergamon
stock, at a cost of approximately $22 million....
"... Leasco alleges that during the negotiations leading to the June 17th
agreement it was misled by defendants as to the financial status of Pergamon and
other of Maxwell's companies and also as to the commercial relations between
Pergamon and the other companies.... Maxwell, in turn, has counterclaimed,
charging that [Leasco's] aim was to depress Pergamon's market price .... "
Leasco is asking for $22 million in actual damages and an unspecified amount of
exemplary damages. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 319 F.
Supp. 1256, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5. Defendants also sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction because
their contacts with the United States were tenuous. In addition, defendants
sought dismissal in favor of British courts on the ground of forum non conveniens:
this doctrine allows a court to dismiss a cause when defendant can meet a burden
of showing that convenience of litigation strongly favors some other jurisdiction.
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 12.17 (1965).
6. This argument was first treated by the court on appeal.
7. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
8. There were two district court dispositions. In the first, Judge Lasker
granted certain motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 319 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In the
second disposition, Judge Ryan denied motions to dismiss for lack of personal and
subject matter jurisdiction and on the ground of forum non conveniens. In the
ruling on subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Ryan concluded that Schoenbaum
implied an "impact test," i.e. subject matter jurisdiction may be exercised
whenever the transaction has a significant impact on a domestic securities market.
Judge Ryan believed that plaintiffs had met this standard. The district court did
not rule on the forum non conveniens argument. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
9. One of the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was
affirmed, one was reversed and one was remanded for further proceedings. The
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with securities transactions occurs within the United States, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is applicable even though the
transactions involve foreign securities not listed on an American
exchange and are consummated abroad. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
When Congress has specified the extent to which a statute is to
apply to transactions having foreign elements, the courts must apply
the statute as written, subject only to the requirement of fair play and
substantial justice inherent in fifth amendment due process, even if
the statute violates international law. 0 Most economic regulatory
statutes, however, contain only general" or incomplete " guidelines
concerning transnational activities; the courts have the task of filling
the lacunae." Two issues have arisen in the judicial resolution of this

appeals court declined to order dismissal under the forum non conveniens
doctrine. See note 39 infra. The instant case has already been followed by the
Eighth Circuit in a closely similar factual situation. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial,
Ltd. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,718 (8th Cir.
1973).
10. This formulation of the due process constraint on judicial jurisdiction,
derived from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), has
been discussed in its transnational context primarily in dicta. See, e.g., United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the
Reach of Substantive Law Under the Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1030,
1033 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust Laws].

11. See, e.g., Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) ("[e] very contract...
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal"); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § § 1-15, 46
U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970) (§ 1312 provides: "This chapter shall apply to all
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in
foreign trade").
12. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b)
(1970), specifically states that the Exchange Act does not apply to anyone
"insofar as he transacts a business in securities" outside the United States unless
he does so in contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission rules. In the
instant case, Pergamon was not transacting a business in securities since only one
large purchase was contemplated. Thus the limitation has no application to the
present case. See generally Note, United States Taxation and Regulation of Off
Shore Mutual Funds, 83 HARV. L. REV. 404, 442-52 (1969).
13. See, e.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (federal Eight
Hour Law interpreted not to extend to employees of United States employers in
Iraq); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 871 (1956) (Lanham Act interpreted not to reach defendant's alleged
patent infringements in Canada); Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944)
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problem: first, despite unclear congressional intent, whether it would
be consistent with the overall statutory purposes for the court to
assume jurisdiction; secondly, what constraints are placed on the
extraterritorial reach of domestic regulation by principles of
international law. 4 In the early 20th century, the issue of statutory
purpose overshadowed questions of international legality by means of
a presumption, first announced by the Supreme Court in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,"5 that Congress did not intend for a
statute to apply to transactions with foreign elements such as
citizenship of the parties or locus of the significant events. Clear
language was required to overcome this presumption.1 6 As international principles of jurisdiction became more clearly formulated,
however, this strong negative presumption weakened. Courts became
more confident that they could avoid excessive claims of jurisdiction
through a careful inquiry into international principles of jurisdic-

(Federal Trade Commission Act interpreted to apply to United States citizen's
fraudulent acts in Latin America). The cases developing approaches to regulated
activity with foreign aspects coming under the Securities Exchange Act have
drawn on this body of decisions. See, e.g., Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 279 F.
Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (§ 16(b) of the Exchange Act applies to activities
instigated abroad but consummated on a domestic securities exchange); Ferraioli
v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Exchange Act applies when
instrumentalities of United States interstate commerce used in a transfer of
control of corporation executed in Canada). Thus as a general proposition, cases
concerning transnational regulated activity contain similar jurisdictional
considerations.
14. There is no significance to the order in which a court might treat these
questions. Courts deciding not to assume jurisdiction, however, usually resolve the
question supporting their decision first and often ignore the other. See, e.g., Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952) (whether district court had
jurisdiction is question "solely of the purport of the municipal law").
15. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Although both parties were domestic American
companies, the Court refused to apply the Sherman Act to defendant's activities
in Latin America. See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). This
extreme position is no longer espoused. See United States v. Pacific & Arctic
Ry. & Navigation, 288 U.S. 87 (1913) (Court may enjoin acts of American in
Alaska pursuant to agreement in restraint of trade made in Canada). Nevertheless,
the presumption survives in less extreme form. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), in
which the court implied that the presumption of domestic applicability might be
overcome if there were no conflicts with international law or problems of
enforcement. See also Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(Congress's primary concern with domestic conditions is basis for presumption).
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tion. 1 In Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,8 the Supreme Court, although
paying lip service to this presumption, finally indicated that in
determining whether the overall statutory purposes would be
advanced by assuming jurisdiction the judiciary's most important task
should be to carry out an open and frank consideration of the policies,
administrative burdens and economic problems involved in extraterritorial enforcement. 19 In resolving the issue of the spatial reach of
domestic regulation, the courts have placed increasing reliance on the
territorial principle of jurisdiction, which has been further refined into
the objective territorial principle and the subjective territorial
principle."' The courts have often confused the objective territorial
principle with the protective principle. The objective territorial
principle, as expounded by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America,2" grants a state jurisdiction to impose
liabilities on conduct occurring outside its territory that was both
intended to and did produce effects within its territory violative of
some domestic rule of law.22 The protective principle, on the other
hand, is directed at extraterritorial conduct that has an adverse effect

16. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952).
17. Compare American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)
with United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1945).
18. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
19. 336 U.S. at 285.
20. The territorial principle is the most important of the five fundamental
principles of jurisdiction. The other four, in generally declining order of
acceptance and importance, are: "second, the nationality principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the person
committing the offense; third, the protective principle, determining jurisdiction
by reference to the national interest injured by the offense; fourth, the
universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the
person committing the offense; and fifth, the passive personality principle,
determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of
the person injured by the offense." Harvard Research in International Law,
Introductory Comment, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
443, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]. Courts often have
not distinguished between the objective and subjective branches when using the
territorial principle and, in effect, rely on both. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 278 (1927).
21. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (on certification from the United States
Supreme Court for failure of a quorum of qualified Justices).
22. 148 F.2d at 443-44. One commentator has stated that the intent portion
of the Alcoa formula could not have been intended to relate to the question of
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on a state's security or governmental interests.2" A broader expression
of the objective principle is found in section eighteen of the
Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, 4 which provides that effects within the nation need only be
foreseeable. The most assertive interpretation of the objective
tenitorial principle was pronounced in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,2" in which fraudulent transactions in the securities of a foreign
corporation occurred entirely outside the United States. Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit held that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction "at least when the transactions involve stock registered
and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the
interests of American investors."2 6 Problems of enforcing judgments
the court's jurisdiction but rather relates only to the question of a violation of the
Sherman Act, because the legitimate power of the state to take jurisdiction over
defendant's acts cannot depend on defendant's subjective intent. Raymond, A
New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558, 560 n.8 (1967).
But see Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). The Court in Strassheim
established a foundation for the Alcoa rule: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but
intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in
punishing the cause of the harm .

. . ."

221 U.S. at 285. A leading discussion of

the objective territorial principle as it relates to criminal jurisdiction is found in
Case of the S.S. Lotus in which the Permanent Court of International Justice
reasoned that criminal law extended to foreign actors "if one of the constituent
elements of the offense, and more especially its effects," took place in the
territory of the injured state. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 23.
23. Thus the protective principle is traditionally used to reach criminal acts
against the state such as counterfeiting of currency. Committee Report, The 1964
Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the ProposedSecurities
and Exchange Commission Rules-InternationalLaw Aspects, 21 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 245 (1966). For a discussion of the distinction between the
objective territorial and protective principles see United States v. Pizzaruso, 388
F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968) (misrepresentation of facts to immigration officials
establishes protective principle jurisdiction). Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965) with § 33.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 18 (1965). The growth in federal economic regulatory
legislation during the 20th century coupled with the increasing frequency of

regulated activities having foreign elements probably has been the major force
underlying the American evolution of the objective principle. See Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust Laws, supra note 10, at 1049-61 (1967); Harvard
Research, supra note 20, at 443; 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (1969).
25. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
26. 405 F.2d at 208.
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adverse to a foreign litigant also have confronted courts. A British
court refused to enforce an American judgment on patent rights
obtained in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,

Ltd.2 because it concluded that the American court's action violated
a British party's rights under British law.2" The second basis used to

extend the spatial reach of domestic regulatory statutes is the

well-established subjective territorial principle.2 9 Section seventeen
of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States3" provides that a nation has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of

law regulating conduct occurring within its territory and related to
some local interest even though the effects of the conduct take place
outside the territory. Opinions vary about how extensive the conduct
in the territory must be to sustain jurisdiction under the subjective
principle.3 1 The cases indicate, however, that the courts will assert
jurisdiction more readily if, in addition to conduct within the United
States, the defendant is an American citizen or effects within the
United States can be demonstrated.3 2 As to the minimum conduct
necessary to sustain a violation of the securities laws, the Supreme
Court, in Mills v. Electric Autolite Co.,3 3 indicated that conduct in

27. 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (when transnational restraints on trade
were effected by patents, court would order compulsory licensing of patents).
28. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., [1952] 2
All E.R. 780 (C.A.). One commentator has suggested that courts largely could
avoid these problems by applying choice-of-law principles. Generally, these
principles would illuminate the propriety of asserting jurisdiction by indicating
which state has the most significant interest in the litigation. Trautman, The Role
of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the InternationalReach of American Regulatory
Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 611-27 (1961). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 6, 148 (1971).
29. Harvard Research, supra note 20, at 444.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).
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31. Judge, later Mr. Justice, Cardozo stated that in criminal cases the acts
must at least amount to an attempt. People v. Werblo, 241 N.Y.S. 55, 148 N.E.
786 (1925). This test was never widely adopted, however, and the Draft

Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime requires only that a crime be
committed "in whole or in part" within the jurisdiction. Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime art. 3, in Harvard Research, supra note 20, at

439.
32. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (American
defendant). See also Raymond, supra note 22, at 559 n.4 and authorities cited
therein.

33. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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the form of misleading proxy solicitations that constituted an
"essential

link" in the causation of a transaction would entitle
plaintiff to relief under the proxy rules.3 4 The Court's opinion was
unclear, however, whether a similar broad, "but for" test3 5 would be
applied as a basis for deciding whether a court should take jurisdiction
under the subjective territorial principle.
The court in the instant case first distinguished the facts from those
36
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.
The Schoenbaum court found injury
to United States investors and markets resulting from acts committed
outside the United States and thus based jurisdiction on the objective
territorial principle. In the instant case, however, the court stated that
the impact in the United States alone would not have been a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction under the objective territorial principle.3" Reasoning that satisfaction oftheMills v. ElectricAutolite Co.
standard indicates ample conduct to assume jurisdiction under the
subjective territorial principle," the court determined that it would
be more appropriate to assert jurisdiction under the subjective
territorial principle since plaintiff had alleged sufficient incidents of
fraud occurring in New York to satisfy the Mills causation
requirements. The court next concluded that asserting jurisdiction
would be consistent with the overall statutory purpose of the
Securities Exchange Act, opining that if Congress had considered this

34. 396 U.S. at 385.
35. "But for" refers to the tort law concept of causation in fact, i.e. if A
would not have happened but for B, B is a necessary cause of A. See generally W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
36. See notes 21 & 22 supra and accompanying text. The court warned that it
was assuming the verity of plaintiff's allegations, and instructed that the trial
court might be compelled to order dismissal if the contacts with the United States
proved de minimis, because "the issue of subject matter jurisdiction persists." 468
F.2d at 1330.
37. "If all the misrepresentations here alleged had occurred in England, we
would entertain most serious doubt whether, despite United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America ... and Schoenbaum, § 10(b) would be applicable simply because
of the adverse effect of the fraudulently induced purchases in England of
securities of an English corporation, not traded in an organized American
securities market, upon an American corporation whose stock is listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and its shareholders." 468 F.2d at 1334.
38. "[I]f defendant's fraudulent acts in the United States significantly
whetted Leasco's interest in acquiring Pergamon shares, it would be immaterial,
from the standpoint of foreign relations law, that the damage resulted, not from
the contract whose execution Maxwell procured in this country, but from
interrelated action which he induced in England or, for that matter, which Leasco
took there on its own." 468 F.2d at 1335.
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matter more thoroughly it would have wished to protect an American
investor from a foreigner who comes to this country and fraudulently
induces the investor to purchase securities abroad. Finally, the court
rejected defendants' contention that choice of law rules require that
the court apply English law. The court stated that since it was
properly seized of the cause of action under the subjective territorial
39
principle, it had jurisdiction to displace foreign law.
The use of the objective territorial principle impact test
exemplified in Schoenbaum and Imperial Chemical Industries has been
criticized as "potentially limitless" since virtually any commercial
transaction can reasonably be said to have some effect on American
commerce. 40 Others have warned that if states with widely divergent
economic and social values were to assert jurisdiction merely on the
basis of some effect within their territory, international commerce
could be subjected to conflicting regulation. 41 Thus, by basing their
jurisdiction to regulate solely on conduct occurring within the United
States, i.e. the subjective territorial principle, the Leasco court has
circumvented these problems associated with the objective principle.
Moreover, the court initially distinguished the validity of exercising
jurisdiction under international law from the desirability of doing so.
Yet, by deciding that the subjective territorial principle allows the
court to displace foreign law, the court has engaged in a circularity
that in future cases could negate the benefits of this recognition
because it does not acknowledge the open, frank determinations of
economic and administrative burdens called for in the Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo approach.42 Ironically the court's rationale easily could
give rise to the problems that the court desired to avoid by rejecting

39. The court also disposed of the motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and for forum non conveniens, believing that personal jurisdiction
would be limited only by the due process clause of the Constitution as expressed
in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The court interpreted the principles
expressed in Hanson to mean "where a defendant has acted within a state or
sufficiently caused consequences there, he may fairly be subjected to its judicial
jurisdiction ....." 468 F.2d at 1340. The court affirmed the denial of the motion
to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens because the balance of
convenience, which favored trial in England, was not strong enough to warrant
dismissal in light of the strong presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum.
468 F.2d at 1344.
40. See Raymond, supra note 22, at 562; ExtraterritorialApplication of
Antitrust Laws, supra note 10, at 1039.
41. Becker, ExtraterritorialDimensions of the Securities Exchange Act, 2
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLITICs 233, 234 (1969).
42. See authorities cited note 28 supra.
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the Schoenbaum rationale. Thus, a court in England following the
approach used by the Leasco court could find that the subjective
principle would allow it to assert jurisdiction since an "essential link,"
the actual closing of the deal, occurred there. Yet if the English court
also argued that the subjective principle allowed it to displace foreign
law, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and to apply its own,
possibly different, standard,43 international commerce could be
subjected to conflicting regulatory standards. 44 This potential
problem demonstrates the need for courts faced with international
transactions to apply choice-of-law principles. These principles would
assist the courts by addressing the policy considerations involved. One
commentator has suggested five factors that should be considered in
the choice-of-law determinations: (1) the importance to the forum
state of a particular regulatory policy; (2) the policy and law of other
jurisdictions; (3) the relative importance to other jurisdictions of the
regulatory scheme; (4) the degree to which parts of transactions are
related to various jurisdictions; and (5) the weights to be given these
factors.4" Application of each of these considerations in the instant
case probably would not have resulted in a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, but a thorough discussion of each would
have established a precedent useful in insuring the extraterritorial
recognition of future, more doubtful cases. An additional difficulty
with the instant decision stems from its treatment of the Mills
causation requirement. The Mills "but for" test does not require that
injury to plaintiff be foreseeable. 46 Yet the present court insists that
damage to plaintiff must occur "within the scope of the risk" of loss.
Thus it is unclear whether future courts will require not only
satisfaction of a "but for" standard for purposes of jurisdiction, but
also that a more stringent foreseeability test be met.4 7
Isaac H. Braddock
43. For a discussion of the British analogues to § 10(b) see Knauss, Securities
Regulation in the United Kingdom: A Comparison With United States Practice, 5
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 106-10, 128-32 (1971).

44. See note 26 supra.
45. Trautman, supra note 28, at 611-27.
46. Note, Causation and Liability in PrivateActions for Proxy Violations, 80
L.J. 107, 123-25 (1970).
47. In the case of the objective territorial principle, as formulated in the
Restatement, mere satisfaction of this "but for" test is clearly insufficient since
YALE

"the effect within the territory must be substantial and occur as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)

FOREIGN

RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES

§ 18

comment f (1965).
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TARIFFS-TRADE AGREEMENT CONCESSIONS MAY BE SUSPENDED ON A
MOST-FAvORED-NATION BASIS WHEN SUCH TREATMENT IS REQUIRED
BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

Plaintiff, an importer of brandy, brought an action against the
United States to protest an increase1 in the duty assessed on brandy
imported from Spain. Presidential Proclamation No. 35642 had

1. The increase was from $1.25 per gallon to $5.00 per gallon.
2. Presidential Proclamation No. 3564, 77 Stat. 1035 (1963), provides:
"Whereas the European Economic Community maintains unreasonable import
restrictions upon imports of poultry from the United States;
"Whereas such unreasonable import restrictions directly and substantially
burden United States commerce;
"Whereas products of the European Economic Community receive benefits of
trade agreement concessions made by the United States;
"Whereas it is consistent with the purposes expressed in Section 102 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1801) for the United States to suspend
the application of the benefits of certain of those trade agreement concessions;
"Whereas, having due regard for the international obligations of the United
States, particularly paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ... requiring any suspension of trade agreement concessions to
be made on a most-favored-nation basis, I am taking steps to suspend, on a
most-favored-nation basis, certain trade agreement concessions in the United
States schedules to that Agreement; and
"Whereas rates of duty suspended by this proclamation will not be required or
appropriate to carry out any trade agreement on and after January 7, 1964:
"Now, Therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of
America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes
of the United States of America, including Section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(c)) and Section 350(a)(6) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended (19 U.S.C. 1351(a)(6)), and in order to suspend the application of the
benefits of certain trade agreement concessions, do hereby proclaim (until such
time as the President of the United States of America otherwise proclaims)"(1) the termination of that part of any prior proclamation which proclaims
rates of duty inconsistent with those provided for in the amendment made by
paragraph (2) of this proclamation; and
"(2) the amendment of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (28 F.R.
8599, as corrected, 28 F.R. 9131) by inserting under the heading 'Subpart B' of
Part 2 of the Appendix thereto the following:
945.16

Brandy, valued over $9.00
per gallon (provided for in
items 168.20 and 168.22)....
$5 per gal."
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effected the increase by suspending on a most-favored-nation basis3
previously proclaimed trade agreement concessions in response to the
implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy by the European
Economic Community (EEC).4 Plaintiff contended that neither
section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962' nor article
3. Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses may be conditional or unconditional.
The conditional type usually provide that any favor, privilege or concession
granted by one of the contracting parties to a third state in relation to a given
subject shall be extended to products of the other contracting party if that
contracting party reciprocates with equivalent concessions. Unconditional mostfavored-nation clauses do not require that the other contracting party reciprocate;
the concessions are extended automatically. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL

LAW 159-60 (3d ed. 1971). Suspending concessions on a most-favored-nation
basis means that nations that have gained the benefit of the concessions through
the operation of MFN treatment lose that benefit when the concession is
suspended between the parties that originally negotiated the concession.
4. This controversy is referred to as the "chicken war." In the latter 1950's,
the American poultry industry discovered a thriving market in Germany. Sales
grew from $2.5 million in 1958 to $35.5 million in 1961. On July 1, 1962,
however, the EEC's import regime replaced Germany's national tariff on poultry.
The tariff tripled and American shipments dropped sharply. The American
reaction to the increased rate on poultry was influenced greatly by questions
concerning the effect of the Common Agricultural Policy on other American
agricultural exports to the EEC. Article XXIV(6) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade provides that the procedures of article XXVIII apply if, in the
formation of a customs union, any duty is increased so as to breach an obligation
under article II. Negotiations were commenced on September 1, 1960, pursuant
to article XXIV(6), but by July 1, 1962, no agreement concerning poultry had
been reached between the United States and the EEC. The United States took
retaliatory action under article XXVIII(3) by raising tariff rates on trucks valued
over $1000, brandy valued over $9 per gallon, potato starch and dextrine. These
items were selected because of their major impact on EEC countries and their
supposed minor injury to third party countries. Walker, Dispute Settlement: The
Chicken War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1964). Although Spain is not a member of
the EEC, the increase was applicable to Spanish products through operation of the
most-favored-nation clause.
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(c) (1970): "Whenever a foreign country or instrumentality, the products of which receive benefits of trade agreement concessions
made by the United States, maintains unreasonable import restrictions which
either directly or indirectly substantially burden United States commerce, the
President may, to the extent that such action is consistent with the purposes of
section 1801 of this title, and having due regard for the international obligations
of the United States-(1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of
benefits of trade agreement concessions to products of such country or
instrumentality, or (2) refrain from proclaiming benefits of trade agreement
concessions to carry out a trade agreement with such country or instrumentality."
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XXVIII(3) 6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade7
authorized the suspension of trade agreement concessions on a
most-favored-nation basis. The Customs Court adopted plaintiff's
position.8 On appeal to the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, held, reversed. Section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 authorizes the President to suspend trade agreement
concessions on a most-favored-nation basis when such treatment is
required by the international obligations of the United States. United
States v. Star Industries, Inc., 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972), cert.
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1972).
The Constitution vests the power to regulate foreign commerce in
the Congress;9 however, Congress has delegated much of its authority

6. Article XXVIII provides for the modification of tariff schedules: "3. (a) If
agreement between the contracting parties primarily concerned cannot be reached
before 1 January 1958 or before the expiration of a period envisaged in paragraph
1 of this Article, the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the
concession shall, nevertheless, be free to do so and if such action is taken any
contracting party with which such concession was initially negotiated, any
contracting party determined under paragraph 1 to have a principal supplying
interest and any contracting party determined under paragraph 1 to have a
substantial interest shall then be free not later than six months after such action is
taken, to withdraw, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which
written notice of such withdrawal is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the applicant
contracting party. (b) If agreement between the contracting parties primarily
concerned is reached but any other contracting party determined under paragraph
1 of the Article to have a substantial interest is not satisfied, such other
contracting party shall be free, not later than six months after action under such
agreement is taken, to withdraw, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day
on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the
applicant contracting party."
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. For a general
discussion of GATT see K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC

ORGANIZATION

(1970); J.

JACKSON,

WORLD

TRADE

AND

GATT (1969).
8. 320 F. Supp. 1018 (Cust. Ct. 1970). The Customs Court also ruled that
the President's alternate reliance on the termination power under 19 U.S.C. §
1351(a)(6) was misplaced, since the proclamation was a temporary modification.
Therefore, § 1882 regulated § 1351(a)(6) in this case and most-favored-nation
treatment was denied. 320 F. Supp. at 1023-24.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
THE LAW OF
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to the executive.l Section 350(a) of the Trade Agreements Act of
193411 authorized the President to enter foreign trade compacts with
foreign governments or instrumentalities for the purpose of expanding
markets for United States products. 1" In Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v.
United States, 3 the court considered the validity of an executive
agreement with Iceland pursuant to section 350(a). Plaintiff contended that the agreement was void because it had not received the advice
and consent of the Senate. The court, however, concluded that the
agreement was an international compact authorized by Congress. The
court also noted that the President has the responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs and that Congress had given him the added
responsibility of negotiating trade agreements in accordance with the
policy of the Act.' 4 The President, relying on an extension of the
power to enter foreign trade agreements pursuant to the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1945, entered the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.'1 Although GATT has never
been submitted to Congress' 6 and no court has ever ruled on its
validity," it is clearly a binding international obligation of the United

10. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MicHr. L. REv. 250 (1967). The constitutionality of

congressional delegation in this area has been upheld. See, e.g., Hampton & Co. v.
United States 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (1970).
12. This power was extended eleven times from 1934 to 1962. 19 U.S.C. §
1352(c) (1970). The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 granted similar authority
effective through July 1, 1967. 19 U.S.C. § 1821 (1970). This authority,
however, was not extended.
13. 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
14. Presidential action in the area of foreign commerce may be invalidated,
however, if the action contravenes the exclusive procedures of the statutory
delegation. See United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.
1953).
15. Jackson, supra note 10, at 255.
16. GATT was conceived as the forerunner of the International Trade
Organization (ITO), which never came into existence. The Executive intended to
submit the ITO agreement to Congress and thereby to give Congress an
opportunity to review the provisions of GATT, many of which were worded
identically in both agreements. The ITO was abandoned, however, and Congress
has never formally approved GATT. Jackson, supra note 10, at 265.
17. The validity of GATT was raised in only one case, and that case was
dismissed on other grounds. Morgantown Glasswork Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d
670 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Other cases, however, have implied that GATT is valid. See,
e.g., Talbot v. Atlantic Steel Co., 275 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Bereut-Vandervoort v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 942 (Cust. Ct. 1957).
Spring, 1973

RECENT DECISIONS

States.18 Furthermore, GATT has been implemented as domestic law
by Presidential proclamation. 9 The most-favored-nation clause,
found in article I, is the heart of GATT."0 The basic most-favorednation clause of article I(1) applies only to a specified list of
obligations, but when considered in conjunction with other GATT
most-favored-nation clauses, it appears that all obligations under
GATT are subject to the principle of nondiscrimination. 2 Article
XXIII, which provides the primary dispute-settlement mechanism,
constitutes an exception to most-favored-nation treatment.2 2 Article
XXIII provides for an investigation by the CONTRACTING PARTIES2 3 of a complaint by a contracting party that a benefit accruing to
it under GATT is being nullified or impaired. If the CONTRACTING
PARTIES find that the benefit is being nullified or impaired, they
may authorize the complainant to suspend the application to any
contracting party of such GATT obligations (including most-favorednation treatment) as they determine to be appropriate. Article XXIII
indicates that GATT uses a political rather than a legal approach to
resolve disputes.24 GATT does not provide legal sanctions because it
is a system of reciprocal rights and obligations that are to be
maintained in balance.2" The main objective of the International
Trade Organization, of which GATT was to be a portion, was to
remove or soften those elements of a conventional jurisprudence that

18. Jackson, supra note 10, at 273-74.
19. Id. at 290-91. The Agreement was proclaimed by Presidential Proclamation No. 2761A, 61 Stat. 1103 (1947). Subsequent proclamations have followed.
20. Article I of GATT reads, in part: "With respect to customs duties and
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or
exportation... any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
21. J. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 270. Exceptions to most-favored-nation
treatment are specifically enumerated in the various articles of GATT, e.g., articles
XX and XXI (security exceptions), article XIV (quantitative restrictions in case of
balance of payments difficulties) and article XXIV (customs unions, free trade
areas and certain cases of frontier traffic and contiguous territory).
22. For a discussion of article XXIII see K. DAM, supra note 7, at 351-75; J.
JACKSON, supra note 7, at 163-89.
23. When used in all capitals, this term refers to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES acting jointly under authorization of article XXV(1) or other clauses of
GATT. Otherwise, "contracting parties" refers to the signatories of GATT
individually.
24. L DAM, supra note 7, at 351-52.
25. Id. at 352.
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lead to direct confrontation."
GATT created formal legal structures,
but the extent to which these structures operate in a given situation
will vary according to the prevailing community sentiment. 7 Failure
to respect a tariff concession, therefore, is not "illegal," but is viewed
as an event giving the affected party the right, subject to the approval
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, to suspend reciprocal concessions.2 8 GATT, however, discourages retaliation by providing procedural limitations in article XXIII.2 9 Alternative procedures, such as
article XXVIII negotiations, also are available for dispute resolution
before the article XXIII stage is reached.3" In addition to the
authority to withdraw concessions under the applicable provisions of
GATT, section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of 196231 permits
the President to suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any
trade agreement concessions accruing to the products of a country or
instrumentality maintaining unreasonable import restrictions. Although
the language of section 252(c) suggests that most-favored-nation
treatment may not be applicable, section 25132 states that mostfavored-nation treatment shall be applied except as otherwise provided
in the subchapter. Furthermore, section 252(c) states that the
President may, "having due regard for the international obligations of
the United States" 3 3 suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of
the concessions. Therefore, the application of most-favored-nation
treatment under section 252(c) in many cases will depend on the
interpretation of a specific international obligation.
In the instant case, the court found that article XXVIII(3) of GATT
requires the application of most-favored-nation treatment. The court
stated that the most-favored-nation clause, embodied in article I and
numerous other articles of the Agreement, furthers one of the primary
purposes of GATT as stated in the preamble-the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce. Since exceptions
to this principle are delineated clearly in GATT, the court reasoned
that the absence of such language indicated that article XXVIII(3) was
not meant to be one of the exceptions. In addition, the court relied on
the history of the GATT proceedings, which indicated that the
26. Hudec, The GATT's Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J.
L. 615, 629 (1970).
27. Id. at 665.
28. K. DAM, supra note 7, at 352.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 353.
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(c) (1970). See note 5 supra.
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1970).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1882(c) (1970).
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framers of GATT intended most-favored-nation treatment to apply to
article XXVIII(3). Furthermore, the court found that most-favorednation treatment under section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 would not be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.3 4 The
court noted that the legislative history of the Act indicated that the
phrase "having due regard for the international obligations of the
United States" barred any indiscriminate breach of most-favorednation treaties. The court then considered the legislative purpose of
the Act, which is to provide the President with strong measures to
combat foreign trade discrimination. Since Presidential Proclamation
No. 3564 focused on the instrumentality maintaining the unreasonable import restrictions, i.e. the EEC, the court concluded that the
President had complied with the intent of Congress and had adhered
to international obligations of the United States. Therefore, the court
held that the President had not exceeded his authority under section
252(c) by issuing Proclamation No. 3564.
The court's conclusion that section 252(c) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 authorizes most-favored-nation treatment in the instant
case is reasonable in light of the congressional delegation authorizing
the President to enter trade agreements.3" Congress merely has
provided the President with the necessary powers to insure that the
purposes of the agreement are fulfilled. Moreover, since Congress has
the power to terminate any of these trade agreements by enacting
subsequent contradictory legislation, 3 6 the court properly concluded
that the phrase "having due regard for the international obligations of
the United States" indicates that Congress did not intend to abrogate
any of the existing agreements. Therefore, in resolving an apparent
conflict between section 252(c) and a prior international obligation,
the courts should examine the agreement in question. The court, in
accordance with the general principle of determining the intent of the

34. The purposes are listed in 19 U.S.C. § 1801: "(1) to stimulate the
economic growth of the United States and maintain and enlarge foreign markets
for the products of United States agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce; (2)
to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the development
of open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world; and (3) to prevent
Communist economic penetration."
35. Congress allowed this authority to lapse in 1967. See note 12 supra.
Section 252(c), however, was not altered. The failure to renew the President's
power to enter foreign trade agreements, therefore, should not affect an
interpretation of § 252(c).
36. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). See also United States v.
Rathjen Bros., 137 F.2d 103 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
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parties, 37 placed great weight on the history of the negotiations.
Strong policy arguments support the holding of the court. Under
article XXVIII(1) negotiations may be initiated between the applicant
contracting party and the party with whom the concession was
originally negotiated. Third parties also may have benefited from this
concession through the operation of the most-favored-nation clause
when the concession was negotiated. Although this benefit may have
been of marginal value to the third party at the time of negotiation,
that party may take part in the negotiations if it subsequently has
developed a substantial interest in the concession.3 8 This procedure
indicates that the third party may enter the negotiations because the
most-favored-nation clause would operate to suspend the benefit of
the concession to that party. As the Government noted in its brief,
there is little reason to continue granting Spain a concession gained
through most-favored-nation treatment after the original concession
has been withdrawn.3 9 Significantly, Spain has not brought any
action under article XXIII. The instant case also raises the broader
question of the application of GATT's jurisprudence in domestic
courts.4" The advantage of GATT's flexible approach to dispute
resolution is the possibility for growth and development. The obvious
disadvantage is the necessary transition from GATT as an international
system to GATT as domestic law in United States courts. In future
cases the courts may have to resolve less clearly defined issues than the
instant one. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES have resolved the issue,
that decision will be binding on the courts. If the courts must resolve
an issue before the CONTRACTING PARTIES do so, however, the
respective determinations may conflict since the courts make legal
decisions and the CONTRACTING PARTIES render political decisions. The issue presented is thus analogous to a "political question."
As the Supreme Court noted in Baker v. Carr,4 political questions are
basically a function of the separation of powers.4 2 Many questions
concerning foreign relations demand a single-voiced statement of the
United States position.43 A judicial ruling on an issue relating to
foreign affairs may prove embarrassing to the executive, if the

37.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

§§ 146-47 (1965).
GATT, art. XXIII.
462 F.2d at 561.
See notes 26 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
369 U.S. at 210.
See 369 U.S. at 211.

UNITED STATES

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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executive subsequently advocates a different position on the same
issue in an international decision-making process. One solution to this
dilemma would be to characterize an interpretation of GATT as a
nonjusticiable political question. A more viable solution would be to
treat the executive's interpretation as authoritative."
The latter
course would allow the judiciary to function in accordance with its
responsibilities under article III of the Constitution, but also would
permit the executive to conduct foreign affairs effectively.4"
David A. Boillot

44. See Cheatham & Maier, Private InternationalLaw and Its Sources, 22
L. REv. 27,79 (1968).
45. This approach is essentially the one taken by the courts in the area of
sovereign immunity. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36
(1945); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). For a general
discussion of these cases see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 57-59 (1972).
VAND.

Vol. 6-No. 2

